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abstract 
 
Dynamic Contracts with Moral Hazard and Adverse
Selection
Alex Gershkovy Motty Perryz
10-01-11
Abstract
We study a novel dynamic principalagent setting with moral hazard
and adverse selection (persistent as well as repeated). In the model an
agent whose skills are his private information faces a nite sequence of
tasks, one after the other. Upon arrival of each task the agent learns its
level of di¢ culty, which is an independent random variable. He then chooses
whether to accept or refuse each task in turn, and how much e¤ort to exert
on those he accepts. Although his decision to accept or refuse a task is
publicly known, the agents e¤ort level is his private information.
We characterize the optimal contract-pair that takes advantage of the
dynamic nature of the interaction. It is shown that if the agent and the
principal discount the future at the same rate, then as the length of the
contract increases, the expected transfer per period decreases and in the
limit approaches the optimal payment when the agents skills are publicly
known. If, however, the agent is less patient than the principal, the result
holds as the agents discount factor increases.
1 Introduction
We study a novel, dynamic principalagent setting with moral hazard and ad-
verse selection (persistent as well as repeated). In the model an agent whose
quality is his private information faces a nite sequence of tasks, one after the
other. Upon arrival of each task the agent discovers its level of di¢ culty, which
is an independent random variable, and decides whether to accept or refuse the
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task. If he accepts, he decides how much e¤ort to exert. Although his deci-
sion to accept or refuse a task is publicly known, his e¤ort level is his private
information and the source of the moral hazard in the model.
There are many economic interactions for which this model might be rel-
evant. For example, a venture capital manager receives funds from investors
who desire to invest their money but lack the knowledge to do so personally.
For a money manager investment opportunities arrive sequentially; some are
easy to assess and manage, others, more di¢ cult. The probability of success
of a given investment is a function of the managers quality, the complexity of
the investment, and the e¤ort exerted in rst analyzing and then following and
directing the investment once it is made. The investors problem then is how
to design an optimal compensation contract in light the moral hazard and ad-
verse selection problems that arise from the fact that the managers quality and
e¤ort as well as the complexity of the available investment opportunities, are
the managers private information. In particular, the investors goal is to create
an incentive schemes that distinguish between low-quality money managers who
cannot do well in complex investments from high-quality managers who can.
Another scenario for which our set up might be of some relevance is the case
of a health-care insurer or public o¢ cial who employs surgeons, whose quality
he does not observe, to treat a ow of patients, the severity of whose ailments
is also the surgeons private information. Our principals problem, then, is to
design a system of contracts that guarantee that surgeries are performed, and
e¤ort is exerted, if and only if the surgeons quality matches the severity of the
patients problem, and to do so at minimal costs.
In our model, an agent signs a contract for T periods, and in every subsequent
period, he encounters one task and decides whether to refuse or to accept it, and
in the latter case, whether to exert a costly, unobservable e¤ort. The probability
of successful accomplishment of a task in every period is monotonic in the agents
e¤ort at that period, but it is also a function of the agents quality and the
complexity of the task in question. While the agents quality is determined once
and for all at the start of the contract, the type of the task is drawn independently
each period, and both the agents quality and the type of the task are the agents
private information.
For simplicity, we conne our attention to a special case where the princi-
pals preferences are lexicographic: he is concerned primarily with matching the
complexity of the task and the quality of the agent, and only secondarily with
payments. More precisely, depending on the agents quality and the comlexity
of the task a di¤erent action of the agent is desired by the principal. If the task
is simple, all types of agents (low- or high-quality) should exert e¤ort; but if the
task is complex, only high-quality agents should exert e¤ort while low-quality
agents should refuse the task.
As is always the case in solving for adverse selection, the principal o¤ers
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the agent a menu of contracts, one for each quality level, that promise nancial
rewards as a function of the observed history of whether tasks were accepted, and
if so, whether they were successfully accomplished. In this menu of contracts, the
optimal contract will be the one that provides the right incentives and minimizes
expected payments.
Thus, the interaction between the principal and the agent is a dynamic model
of moral hazard and repeated (and persistent) adverse selection: moral hazard
arises from the fact that the principal cannot observe the agents e¤ort, and
adverse selection, from the fact that the principal cannot observe the agents
quality or the tasks complexity.
We start with a model where agents are risk-neutral and they discount the
future at the same rate as the principal. With this rather stylized model we char-
acterize the optimal contract-pair that takes advantage of the dynamic nature
of the interaction. It is shown that as the length of the contract increases, the
expected transfer per period decreases and in the limit approaches the optimal
payment when an agents quality is publicly known. We could obtain this result
because the dynamics enables us to make the contract of the high-quality agent
unattractive to the low-quality one increasingly so as the length of the contract
increases. The intuition beyond this result is rather simple. Exerting e¤ort on a
task is a gamble whose probability of success is higher, the higher is the quality
of the agent. Successful accomplishment of a sequence of tasks is exponentially
less likely for a low-quality agent. An optimal contract for a high-quality agent
takes advantage of this fact by stipulating high rewards for a long history of
successes. To construct these type of sequences and at the same time preserve
incentives to exert e¤ort, the optimal contract stipulates that in every period
t; a success is rewarded only if it is followed by an uninterrupted sequence of
successes until period T; the end of the contract.
The optimal contract for the high-quality agent, in which he is compensated
for a success in period t only if he keeps succeeding in every period thereafter till
the end of the contract, looks rather extreme when T becomes large. Not only is
the contract very risky, but it also has the unpleasant feature that no payment
is guaranteed until the end of the contract at T . Of course, these features are
irrelevant when the agent and the principal are both risk-neutral and do not
discount future payments, as is assumed in this basic model. Yet, we show that
for T large enough, the set of optimal contracts is not a singleton and there are
other contracts in the set in which these two features are relaxed dramatically.
We next turn to the case where the agent is less patient than the principal.
We show that the optimal contract-pair is essentially unique. Moreover, the
property of using the dynamics to make the contract of the high-quality agent
more risky is preserved by postponing rewards for success in t until some later
period t0 > t and making them conditional on success in all periods in between.
But unlike the case with no discounting where this procedure incurred no costs,
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the principal now faces a trade-o¤ and as a result the optimal contract-pair takes
a less extreme form even for short-term contracts. That is, conditional on the
agent being a high-quality one, postponing his payments for success in period t
to some period t0 > t is costly to the principal because he must then increase the
expected payment to compensate the agent for the delay. But conditional on the
agent being a low-quality agent, postponing the payments in the contract for the
high-quality agent is benecial because it makes this contract less attractive to
the low-quality agent and enables the principal to lower the expected payments
to this agent.
It follows that in contrast to the no-discounting case, in this case it may not
be optimal to postpone payments for success to later periods (let alone period T ):
On the one hand, it is better for the principal to start the procedure of postponing
payments only after histories that are more likely to occur in the event that
the low-quality agent accepted this contract. On the other hand, applying this
procedure at a later stage reduces its e¤ectiveness. We illustrate this trade-o¤
by means of a simple example where it is shown that sometimes payments are
not postponed initially, but only after histories that are unlikely to occur when
the agent is a high-quality one. We then provide a partial characterization of
the unique optimal contract and a more complete characterization for a discount
factor close enough to one.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is a brief survey of the literature.
We present the basic setup with no-discounting and risk neutrality in Section
3. In Section 4 we dene the notion of an admissible contract. The optimal
contract-pair is characterized in Section 5. In Section 6 we study the case where
agents are less patient than the principal. Section 7 concludes. Most of the
proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
2 Related Literature
The existing models evolved gradually from models of moral hazard only to
models in which moral hazard as well as adverse selection problems are present,
and from models in which only short-term contracts are o¤ered to those in which
the principal can commit to a long-term contract. The small sample of papers
discussed below attest to this evolution, and no attempt is made to provide an
exhaustive survey of a very productive eld.
One of the rst papers on dynamic agency is Rubinstein and Yaari (1983),
which considered an innitely repeated moral hazard problem and demonstrated
the existence of a strategy for the principal that yields the rst best in an en-
vironment in which the principal cannot commit to a strategy that governs the
relation. It is worth noting, however, that the innitely repeated aspect of their
problem is crucial to the derivation of their result, which indeed falls within the
realm of the theory of repeated games. In a pioneering paper on career concern
4
and reputation, Holstrom (1982) studied the provision of incentives to exert e¤ort
when the agents ability is unobserved in nitely repeated interactions without
output-contingent multi-period contracts.
La¤ont and Tirole (1988) explored a dynamic two-period model of moral haz-
ard and adverse selection and identied the ratchet e¤ect that occurs whenever
the principal is constrained to o¤er a short-term contract. That is, the equilib-
rium is characterized by more pooling in the rst period as agents internalize
the cost involved in revealing their type. Baron and Besankos (1984) model of
moral hazard and adverse selection is one in which the principal can commit to a
long-term strategy, but the moral hazard problem is not dynamic. In particular,
they studied the case of a regulated monopoly that rst invests in R&D and in
subsequent periods observes privately its marginal cost, which depends stochas-
tically on the level of investment in R&D in period zero. Thus, their model is
a one-shot moral hazard problem followed by a multi-period incentive scheme
under adverse selection.
An important contribution is Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987), which studied
a nitely (as well as a continuous-time) repeated moral hazard problem, but,
unlike the RubinsteinYaari model, and along the lines we are pursuing in our
paper, the principal in their model can commit to a long-term strategy that
governs the relations in all periods. That is, the principal pays the agent at
the end of the last period based on the entire observable history. It is shown
that the optimal compensation scheme is a simple linear function of observable
events. Similarly, Malcomson and Spinnewyn (1988), Rey and Salanie (1990),
and Fudenberg, Holmstrom, and Milgrom (1990) studied the question of when
the long-term optimal contract can be replicated by a sequence of short-term
(spot) contracts.
DeMarzo and Fishman (2007) analyzed a dynamic moral-hazard problem
in which the principal uses multidimensional tools to provide incentives to the
agents. One is through instant cash payments, and another is by a¤ecting the
continuation value of the agent. Because the agent in this model is less patient
than the principal, absent moral hazard, compensation for the agents e¤ort at
a given period should be made immediately. However, postponing the payment
mitigates the agency problem presented by the moral hazard, since it increases
the share of the agent in future prots. Hence, the optimal contract balances this
trade-o¤ and involves both instruments. In our model, in contrast, postponing
payment and conditioning it on the revealed performance in between alleviates
the screening problem and allows the principal to decrease the compensation of
the low-quality agent.
Biais, Mariotti , Plantin, and Rochet (2007) extended DeMarzo and Fish-
mans (2007) analysis to an innite-horizon model and showed that the agent
receives cash compensation only when the accumulated performance reaches a
prespecied threshold. Moreover, they illustrated how the optimal contract is
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implemented with standard nancial instruments and showed the convergence
of the discrete-time model to the continuous-time version of DeMarzo and San-
nikovs (2006) model. Sannikov (2008) used a very elegant technique based on
the Martingale Representation Theorem to solve a continuous-time moral hazard
problem that allowed him to obtain a very clean characterization of the optimal
contract. The optimal balance between immediate compensation and the contin-
uation value was shown also in Biais, Mariotti, Rochet, and Villeneuve (2010),
where the principal can a¤ect the agents continuation value through a change
in the rms size. In a recent paper Edmans, Gabaix, Sadzik, and Sannikov
(2010) analyzed a dynamic moral hazard problem with a risk-averse agent and a
risk-neutral principal. In their paper, too, compensation for performance in any
given period is spread over future periods. The optimality of the spread follows
from the optimal risk-sharing perspective, while in our paper the spread is used
to reduce the cost of screening the types of the agent.
A signicant di¤erence between our model and the multi-periods models
described above is that the latter are concerned solely with a dynamic moral
hazard problem where it is possible to summarize the agents incentives using
his continuation value, i.e., the agents future expected payo¤when he follows the
requested sequence of actions. This method is not applicable to the environment
in our model, where there is also an element of adverse selection, since the
incentives of di¤erent types of agents should be taken into account.
Fong (2009) combined the problem of moral hazard and adverse selection in
the dynamic environment of health care provision. As in our model, in Fongs
model the principal seeks to induce the agent to follow some course of action
that may depend on the type of the agent. But Fong does not allow for the use of
money as an instrument in the contracts. It follows that the only available tool
for providing incentives is the ow rate of tasks and Fongs rst result is that
there is no need to consider complicated contracts because an optimal policy
takes the form of a stopping rule that species if and when an agent is to be
permanently red. The main result is a characterization of the optimal contract-
pair that takes the form of scoring rules in which the agents past performance
is summarized by a single score and the agent is red if his score falls below a
certain threshold, and he is tenured if his score rises above some other threshold.
Contracts for agents of di¤erent quality levels are di¤erent in their sensitivity to
success and failure. Another study of a continuous-time model of dynamic agency
with moral hazard and adverse selection is Sannikov (2007). In Sannikovs model
a principal employs an agent of unknown skill, where the principal observes no
information during the contract period and needs to condition his compensation
only on the reports of the agent. In this environment, to prevent manipulation
by the agent, the optimal contract requires very specic conditioning of the
compensation for the reported information. More precisely, the agent gets a
credit line and he is compensated only if the balance of the line was above the
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prespecied cuto¤ during the whole contract period.
Our model incorporates all the incentive problems mentioned above. On
the one hand, it is a dynamic moral hazard model, since the agents choice of
e¤ort in any given period is unobservable. On the other hand, there are two
types of adverse selection problems to overcome: a persistent adverse selection
problem due to the unobservability of the agents competence as determined in
period zero, and a dynamic adverse selection problem due to the fact that the
complexity of the task, which is di¤erent in every period, is observable only by
the agent.
3 The Model
Basic setup
Consider an agent who is employed by a principal for T periods. In every
period t 2 f1; 2; :::; Tg, the agent receives a task and has to decide whether
to accept or refuse it and in the former case whether to exert a costly e¤ort
C 2 f0; cg. The probability of successfully accomplishing the task in period t is
positive only if C = c, but it is also a function of the agents quality, denoted
by s; and the tasks level of di¢ culty at t; denoted by pt and referred to as the
tasks typeat t:
An agents quality is either low or high and is denoted by s 2 fh; lg; re-
spectively. Conditional on exerting e¤ort c; an agent of type h has a higher
probability of succeeding at a given task. Similarly, the task arriving in period
t is either easy or di¢ cult (pt 2 fe; dg; respectively), and conditional on the
agents quality, the probability of success is higher when the task is easy. We
assume that for all t 2 f1; 2; :::; Tg; the tasks type pt 2 fe; dg is independently
drawn and the probability that the task is of type d is q and type e is (1   q):
Finally, the quality of the agent is his private information and the tasks type pt
is revealed only at t and only to the agent.
Technology
The probability  : f0; cg  fl; hg  fe; dg ! [0; 1] of success at a given task
is
(C; s; pt) =
(
0 if C = 0
(s ; pt) otherwise
where for s 2 fh; lg and pt 2 fe; dg we have
(i) 0 < (s; pt) < 1
(ii) (h;e) > (h;d) and (l;e) > (l;d)
(iii) (h;e) > (l;e) and (h;d) > (l;d):
Thus, conditional on exerting e¤ort c, the agents probability of success is higher
if he is of high quality, for any type of task; and is higher when the task is
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easy, for any type of agent. The analysis reveals that the nature of the optimal
contract depends on whether (l;e) > (h;d) or (h;d) > (l;e): The bulk of the
paper is devoted to the more interesting case where (l;e)  (h;d); while the
treatment of the other case, being very similar, is provided in Appendix B.
Preferences
We start by assuming that the agent and the principal do not discount future
payments.1 The case of the di¤erent time preferences is analyzed in Section 6.
The agents VNM utility is a function of e¤orts and payments only. In particular,
the utility of an agent who exerts e¤ort in k periods and receives a total payment
of m is m  ck. Thus, the agent is assumed to be risk-neutral and to maximize
expected payment minus costs. The outside option generates a stream of utilities,
which, for simplicity, are normalized to zero per period. Consequently, due to
limited liability, negative payments are ruled out.
The principal
The agent here is employed by a principal. If the agent is a low-quality agent,
i.e., s = l; the principal would like him to refuse a di¢ cult task and to exert e¤ort
only if the task is an easy one, pt = e. If, however, the agent is a high-quality
one, s = h, then the principal would like him to exert e¤ort on all types of tasks,
easy as well as di¢ cult ones.
Conditional on the agent doing what is expected, the principals objective
is to minimize expected payment. Thus, the principals preferences are lexico-
graphic. First and foremost, he is interested in providing incentives to the agent
to accept tasks and to exert e¤ort only when desirable. As there are many mech-
anisms that lead to these incentives, the principal is interested in the one that
minimizes expected payment.
The principal can fully commit at time t = 0 to any observable history-
dependent contract governing the agents payments. Because the e¤ort C, the
agents quality s; and the types of task pt; for t 2 f1; :::; Tg; are not observable by
the principal, the only information available to the principal at t is a specication,
for every t0  t; as to whether the task was accepted by the agent, and if so
whether it was accomplished successfully or not.
4 Contracts
Recall that in our setup the principal, in every period t; observes one of three
possible outcomes: (i) the task was accomplished successfully, (ii) the task was
not performed, and (iii) the task was not successfully accomplished, which we de-
note by f1; 0; 1g; respectively. A contract thus species for every t 2 f1; :::; Tg
the payment to the agent as a function of the observable history up to (and in-
cluding) t which is a sequence of t elements from 	 = f1; 0; 1g and is denoted
1The results are essentially the same if we assume that they discount future payments at
the same rate.
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Figure 1: Two-period contract for the agent of type s, which species for any
possible two-period history !2 the payment to this agent,  s2 (!2).
by !t where 
t denotes the set of all possible histories from time zero to t.2
Without loss of generality we can assume that all payments are postponed to
the last period, T , and dene a contract as follows.3
Denition 1 A T -period contract is a mapping T : 
T ! R+ specifying the
payment to the agent as a function of the observed history !T 2 
T .
As is typically the case in solving problems of adverse selection, the principal
o¤ers a menu of contracts, from which the agent chooses the contract that is best
for him given his quality. Without loss of generality, we can restrict our attention
to a mechanism in which only two contracts are o¤ered by the principal: hT to
the high-quality agent and  lT to the low-quality one.
A two-period contract for an agent of type s 2 fh; lg is depicted below. Note
that for every history !t 2 
t we associate a subgame sub!t that contains all
possible observable histories following !t4:
Denition 2 Admissible Contract-pair: A pair of contracts (hT ; 
l
T ) is called
admissible if it satises incentive compatibility (IC), individual rationality (IR),
and e¢ ciency (EF) where:
IC an agent of quality h prefers the contract hT to 
l
T , while the opposite
holds for an agent of quality l.
2Following convention, we let ? denote the history in period zero.
3This denition will be modied in Section (6) when we relax the assumption that the agents
do not discount future payments.
4The notion of subgame here, although obvious, is not exactly the one used in game theory.
9
IR  the contract  sT yields a non-negative expected payo¤ to an agent of
quality s 2 fh; lg starting after every history !t 2 
t and for all t 2 f1; 2; :::; Tg.
EF  for all t 2 f1; 2; :::; Tg; an agent of quality h prefers to exert e¤ort on
all types of tasks, while an agent of quality l prefers to exert e¤ort at t if and
only if the task is of type e.
Remark 1 If (hT ; 
l
T ) is admissible, then 
h
T must entail taking the task in
every period along the equilibrium path. It follows that if hT (!
0
T ) > 0 for some
!0T containing an outcome of zero (refuse), then there exists another contract
~hT in which ~
h
T (!
0
T ) = 0 and ~
h
T (!T ) = 
h
T (!T ) for all !T 6= !0T such that
the new pair
 
~hT ; 
l
T

is admissible and yields, in equilibrium, the same expected
payment to the principal. Thus, without loss of generality, we hereafter restrict
our attention to contracts for the high-quality agent that pay zero whenever the
history contains an outcome of zero. That is, if (hT ; 
l
T ) is admissible, then
hT (!
0
T ) = 0 whenever f0g 2 !0T :
Remark 2 Note that if at some t and !t the contract provides the agent with
incentives to exert e¤ort on a given tasks type, then the agent will exert e¤ort
whenever the arriving task has a higher probability of success. This implies that
a contract pair (hT ; 
l
T ) satises EF if 
h
T provides the high-quality agent with
incentives to exert e¤ort whenever a di¢ cult task arrives (i.e., pt = d); while  lT
provides the low-quality agent with incentives to exert e¤ort only if the task is
easy.
Remark 3 Since the agent can always choose to refuse, and since all payments
are non-negative, all contracts satisfy IR.
Of all admissible contract-pairs, we are interested in the one that minimizes
expected payment. Denote by ms
0
( sT ; sub!t) the ex-ante (before observing the
tasks type in period t + 1) expected payment of contract  sT to an agent of
quality s0 conditional on history !t being reached and conditional on playing
optimally thereafter and let us
0
( sT ; sub!t) denote the ex-ante expected utility
provided by contract  sT to an agent of type s
0 conditional on reaching history
!t and conditional on playing optimally thereafter. Note that ms( sT ; sub?) and
us( sT ; sub?) are monotonically related in all contracts 
s
T satisfying EF. This is
so because expected costs to an agent of quality s are the same in all contracts
satisfying EF. In particular, given a T -period admissible contract-pair (hT ; 
l
T ),
it is straightforward to verify that
uh(hT ; sub!t) = m
h(hT ; sub!t)  c(T   t)
and
ul( lT ; sub!t) = m
l( lT ; sub!t)  c(1  q)(T   t)
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where, as dened above, (1   q) is the probability that the task is easy, i.e.,
pt = e:
We are now in a position to dene an optimal contract-pair.
Denition 3 An Optimal Contract-pair. A pair of contracts (^hT ; ^
l
T ) is
called optimal if it is admissible, and if for every admissible contract-pair (hT ; 
l
T )
we have
mh(hT ; sub?)  mh(^hT ; sub?) and ml( lT ; sub?)  ml(^ lT ; sub?):
Finally, denote by ps the ex-ante probability of a successful task by a quality
s agent when e¤ort is exerted. That is,
ph = q(h;d) + (1  q)(h;e)
and
pl = q(l;d) + (1  q)(l;e).
5 The Optimal Contract-pair
In this section we maintain the assumption that (l;e) > (h;d) and show that the
optimal contract-pair is a separating pair, in the sense that agents of di¤erent
quality sign di¤erent contracts. When this assumption does not hold (i.e., (l;e) 
(h;d)) the unique optimal contract-pair is pooling. Since the analysis of the
pooling case is very similar to that of the separating case, it is postponed to
Appendix B.
We start by characterizing the set of optimal contracts when the agent is
known to be a high-quality agent, and denote this set by  hT . We then show that
when the agents quality is unobservable, the contract o¤ered to the high-quality
agent belongs to  hT . Thus, when quality is unobservable, the contract assigned
to the high-quality agent is the second-best contract as it does not generate
information rents that correspond to the unobserved type of the agent and the
binding constraint is the incentive constraint on the low-quality agent, whose
purpose is to ensure that he prefers the contract assigned to him to the one
assigned to the high-quality agent.
While the high-quality agent is indi¤erent between all contracts in  hT (see
point 2 below), this is not the case for the low-quality agent. The main theorem
of this section establishes that the optimal contract for the high-quality agent
is the contract in  hT that would minimize the payo¤ of the low-quality agent
if he pretended to be a high-quality one and accepted it. In this contract a
success in period t is rewarded only if it is followed by a success in every period
following t: This contract, in a way, is the riskiest contract in  hT ; however, and
this is crucial, it is exponentially more risky for the low-quality agent than it is
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for the high-quality one. In contrast, the optimal contract for the low-quality
agent is the contract that pays a xed amount per successful task and makes
the low-quality agent indi¤erent between the two contracts. It is shown that
as T gets larger, the per-success expected payment in the optimal contract-pair
approaches the expected amount paid when quality is observable.
5.1 Agents Quality is Known to be High
We now characterize the set of optimal contracts for an agent whose quality is
known to be high. A contract ^hT belongs to  
h
T if it satises IR and EF and if
there is no other contract hT that also satises IR and EF and for which expected
payment is lower, i.e., mh(hT ; sub?) < m
h(^hT ; sub?). Before we proceed and
study the properties of  hT ; a few points are worth mentioning.
1. Note that although the agents quality is observable, there are still prob-
lems of moral hazard and adverse selection to solve because the agents
e¤ort and the tasks type are not observable by the principal. Indeed, note
that if the tasks type is also observable, then a rst-best solution can be
achieved through a simple contract that promises a payment of c=(h;d) per
success at a di¢ cult task (pt = d), and a payment of c=(h;e) per success at
an easy task (pt = e). Such a contract satises EF and at the same time
brings the agent to his IR utility. However, when the type of the task is
not observable to the principal and he relies on the agents report of the
tasks type, the contract is not incentive-compatible since the agent will
always report that the task is di¢ cult. As a result, when the tasks type is
not observable, the optimal contract does leave the agent some information
rent.
Indeed, if ^hT 2  hT ; then for every history !T 1 2 
T 1, ^hT provides
incentives for the agent to exert e¤ort whenever the task is di¢ cult. Con-
sider the following feasible strategy for the agent: do not exert e¤ort in
all periods t 2 f1; ::; T   1g and exert e¤ort in T only if the task is easy.
Note that this strategy guarantees a strictly positive expected payo¤ since
the payment after a sequence of failures is non-negative and the payment
in the last period provides incentives even if pT = d. We conclude that if
^hT 2  hT ; then uh(hT ; sub?) > 0.
2. The denition of  hT implies that expected payment is the same in all
contracts in  hT . Since expected costs are the same in all contracts satisfying
EF and in particular in all contracts in  hT ; the agent is indi¤erent between
all contracts in  hT :
A three-period contract for a high-quality agent, where histories containing
zeroes are ignored, is described below.
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Figure 2: Three-period contract for a high-quality agent, which species for any
possible three-period history !3 the payment to this agent, h3 (!3).
The following lemma, proved in Appendix A, lists a few properties that are
satised by all contracts belonging to  hT : These properties are then used to
characterize the set  hT of optimal contracts.
Lemma 1 Properties of  hT
1. If hK 2  hK ; then 9 hK 1 2  hK 1 s.t. 8!K 1 2 
K 1; hK ( 1; !K 1) =
hK 1 (!K 1).
2. If hK 2  hK ; then uh
 
hK ; sub1
  uh  hK ; sub 1 = c(h;d) :
3. If hK 2  hK ; then mhK
 
hK ; sub?

= Kph c(h;d)
.
4. Assume that ~hT satises IR and EF, but ~
h
T =2  hT : Then, there exists
hT 2  hT such that for any history !T 2 
T ; ~hT (!T )  hT (!T ) with strict
inequality for at least one history !0T 2 
T .
The rst property of the lemma refers to the payments restricted to sub 1:
In the context of Figure 2 above, it says that if a three-period contract belongs
to  h3 ; then the induced two-period contract in sub 1 belongs to  h2 . In other
words, a failure in period one is not rewarded, and, as a result, from period two
on, the agent faces a K   1-period contract.
Property 2 follows from the fact that e¤ort is not observable and will not be
exerted unless incentives are provided. In particular, if the rst task to arrive
turns out to be di¢ cult, the agent will not exert e¤ort unless the di¤erence in
expected payo¤ between a success and a failure is enough to justify the risk of
failure, an event that occurs with probability (1  (h;d)) if e¤ort is exerted. In
a K-period contract, the reward for success in the rst period (which occurs
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with probability (h;d) if the task is di¢ cult and e¤ort is exerted) is given by
uh
 
hK ; sub1
   uh  hK ; sub 1. Thus, exerting e¤ort on a di¢ cult task is ben-
ecial only if the expected gain is greater than the cost of exerting e¤ort, that
is, only if (h;d)[uh
 
hK ; sub1
   uh  hK ; sub 1]  c: The content of the second
property is that an optimal contract generates, in the rst period, the minimal
spread between the two subgames, that is needed to provide these incentives.
Property 3 follows from the one-to-one relations between expected utility
and expected payment when EF is satised, and in particular it implies that
Property 2 can be rewritten as
mh

hK ; sub1

 mh

hK ; sub 1

=
c
(h;d)
:
Of course, the exact same argument holds in every period. That is, in every
period incentives to exert e¤ort on a di¢ cult task must be provided. Thus, for
all t  T and for every history !t the expected reward for success must be at
least c(h;d) , and it holds with equality in the rst period. Finally, recall that
ex-ante success occurs with probability ph = q(h;d) + (1  q)(h;e); and you get
the expected payment in a K-period contract specied in Property 3.
The rst three properties are employed in the proof of the fourth property,
which establishes an important characteristic property of the set  hK . That is,
if a contract is not optimal, then there exists an optimal contract that pays
less in every possible history. The proof of the following lemma, which is rele-
gated to Appendix A, makes use of the four properties in Lemma 1 to provide a
characterization of  hT and in particular to show that for all T;  
h
T 6= ?.
Lemma 2 Characterization of  hT .
i. h1 2  h1 if and only if h1(1) = c=(h;d) ,h1( 1) = 0; and h1(0) = 0:
ii. hK+1 2  hK+1 if and only if K+1 can be constructed from contracts in
 hK according to the following procedure:
ii.1 The K+1 payments restricted to sub 1 are a contract in  hK :
ii.2 The K+1 payments restricted to sub1 are a contract in  hK inated
by an expected payment of c=(h;d); which is allocated to the di¤erent
histories of sub1 in any way, provided that incentives to exert e¤orts
are not distorted.
Recall that by denition the expected payment is the same in all optimal
contracts. This fact together with Lemma 2 yields the following simple corollary
and also establishes that the set  hT is not empty.
Corollary 1 The set  hT 6= ? and in particular the contract ^hT 2  hT ; where
^hT (!T ) =
c
(h;d)
n (!T ) ; and n (!T ) is the number of successful tasks in !T . Thus,
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a contract is optimal only if it pays in expectation c=(h;d) for every successful
task.
5.2 Agents Quality is Unobservable
Having characterized the set  hT we are now ready to study the case where the
agents quality is unobservable. Note that now the IC constraint must be taken
into account since the agent will choose the contract that maximizes his expected
utility, and not necessarily the one designed for him by the principal. We start
by showing that if a contract-pair (hT ; 
l
T ) is optimal, then 
h
T 2  hT :
Lemma 3 If (hT ; 
l
T ) is an optimal contract-pair, then 
h
T 2  hT .
Proof. Assume by way of contradiction that (^hT ; ^
l
T ) is optimal but ^
h
T =2  hT .
Since (^hT ; ^
l
T ) is an optimal contract-pair, it is admissible, and, in particular,
both contracts satisfy IR and EF. Hence, Property 4 in Lemma 1 implies that
there exists a contract ~hT 2  hT such that for all history !T 2 
T , ^hT (!T ) 
~hT (!T ) with strict inequality for at least one history. Hence, replacing ^
h
T with
~hT will decrease the expected utility of the low-quality agent in the event that
he pretends to be a high-quality agent by adopting the high-quality agents
contract. Consider a contract ~ lT that pays r  c=(l;e) per success and makes
the low-quality agent indi¤erent to the contract ~hT : To see that such a contract
~ lT always exists, it is enough to note that (i) a low-quality agent can always
adopt the contract ~hT and then exert no e¤ort to obtain a non-negative utility,
and (ii) a contract that pays c=(l;e) per success satises EF and yields zero
expected utility to the low-quality agent.
We next argue that (~hT ; ~
l
T ) is admissible. That is, (i) r  c=(l;d); and
(ii) the high-quality agent prefers the contract ~hT to ~
l
T : Note, however, that
r  c=(h;d) is su¢ cient for (i) and (ii). This is because (i) follows from c=(h;d) <
c=(l;d) and (ii) from the fact that a contract that pays c=(h;d) per success
belongs to  hT and the high-quality agent is indi¤erent between all contracts
in  ^hT : Therefore, if r  c=(h;d), the contract-pair (~hT ; ~ lT ) is admissible and
generates a lower expected payment to both agents than the pair (^hT ; ^
l
T ); which
is a contradiction.
Let us therefore assume that r > c=(h;d) and observe that a contract-pair
that pays c=(h;d) per success to both types of agents is admissible and provides
both types of agents with an expected utility lower than (^hT ; ^
l
T ); which is again
in contradiction to the assumed optimality of the original pair. We conclude
that if a contract-pair (^hT ; ^
l
T ) is optimal, then ^
h
T 2  hT :
Note that while di¤erent contracts in  hT generate the same expected utility
for the high-quality agent, they generate di¤erent expected utilities for the low-
quality one, if he chooses to adopt them. It thus follows from Lemma 3 that
a contract-pair (^hT ; ^
l
T ) is optimal if the contract ^
h
T is the one that minimizes
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the expected utility of the low-quality agent among all contracts in  hT . In other
words, from the high-quality agents point of view, the set  hT consists of di¤erent
lotteries between which he is indi¤erent. However, from the point of view of the
low-quality agent, these are di¤erent lotteries and ^hT , to be dened below, is the
riskiest among them. That is, although the set  hT for T > 1 is not a singleton
and contains many contracts, asymmetric information about the agents type
narrows down the contracts that the designer o¤ers to the high-quality agent.
The theorem also establishes that as T !1, the optimal contract-pair converges
to the second-best pair, that is, the contract-pair that is o¤ered when the agents
quality is observable.
Prior to presenting the formal statement of the theorem, we describe its
content when T = 2: In this case the theorem postulates that if the high-quality
agent accepts the task in period one and succeeds, he is compensated for this
only if he also succeeds in period two. The compensation in the event that there
are two successes in a row must be high enough to cover the extra risk involved
in exerting e¤ort in period one. Specically;
^h2 =
8>>>><>>>>:
c
(h;d)
1+ph
ph
if !2 = (1; 1)
c
(h;d)
if !2 = ( 1; 1)
0 if !2 = (1; 1)
0 if !2 = ( 1; 1)
Note that while the high-quality agent (being risk-neutral) is indi¤erent between
this contract and the one that pays c(h;d) per success, the low-quality agent
strictly prefers the latter.
The following theorem characterizes the optimal contract-pair for T periods,
while making use of the following denitions:
(i) Dene A(k) recursively by letting A(0) = 0 and A (k) = A (k   1) +
1
(ph)
k 1 .
(ii) Let ~k(!T ) be the length of the longest uninterrupted sequence of successes
in !T ; starting from period T and proceeding backward.
Theorem 1 An optimal contract-pair
 
^hT ; ^
l
T

has the following properties:
1. If !T contains an outcome of 0, then ^hT (!T ) = 0. Otherwise, if ~k(!T ) =
k, then ^hT (!T ) =
c
(h;d)
A(k):
2. There exists a constant r; such that ^ lT (!T ) = rn (!T ), where n (!T ) is
the number of successes in !T . Moreover, limT!1 r = c(l;e) .
In words, the optimal contract for the high-quality agent pays zero after an
history in which a task was refused at least once, and otherwise the agent is
compensated only for those successes that were followed by an uninterrupted
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sequence of successes all the way to the end of the contract.(part (1) of the theo-
rem). The optimal contract for the low-quality agent gives him a xed constant
payment per success (part (2) of the theorem). Theorem 1 provides the exact
compensation scheme that depends on the number of uninterrupted successes
starting from the end of the contract and proceeding backward. To provide
incentives to the high-quality agent, the expected payment should increase by
c
(h;d)
per success. In order to decrease the expected utility of the low-quality
agent from this contract, the payment for success in every period t should be
postponed until the end of the game and provided only if it is followed by an
uninterrupted sequence of successes. Paying ^hT (!T ) =
c
(h;d)
A(k) after history
!t satises both requirements.
Proof. We start the proof by showing that the contract ^hT described in the the-
orem minimizes the expected utility of the low-quality agent in all the contracts
that belong to  hT . The formal argument follows from Claim 1, setting ~u = 0;
the proof of the claim is relegated to Appendix A. First, note that if f0g 2 !T
and ^hT (!T ) > 0, then decreasing this payment will not a¤ect the expected util-
ity of the high-quality agent and will decrease (or will not a¤ect) the expected
utility of the low-quality agent from this contract. Therefore, without loss of
generality we can restrict our attention to contracts in  hT ; where the payments
after histories containing f0g are zero.
Claim 1 Let uhT denote the expected utility of the high-quality agent from any
contract in  hT . For any ~u  0 let  hT (~u) be the set of T -period contracts such
that each of them (i) provides the high-quality agent with incentives to exert
e¤ort in all T periods and (ii) generates an expected utility of uhT + ~u for the
high-quality agent. The contract  2  hT (~u) that minimizes the expected utility
of the low-quality agent in all contracts in  hT (~u) is achieved by amending the
contract ^hT described in Theorem 1-1 by adding a payment of ~u=
 
ph
T
after a
sequence of T successful tasks.
Proof. (continued) We proceed by constructing the contract ^ lT described in
Theorem 1. The constant r in ^ lT is chosen so that the low-quality agent is
indi¤erent between choosing ^ lT and ^
h
T . Since the expected utility of the low-
quality agent from ^hT is positive (one possible strategy for him is to invest only
in period T and only if the task is easy), we have r > c=(l;e). Moreover, since a
contract that pays c=(h;d) per success belongs to  hT ; Claim 1 implies that the
utility of the low-quality agent from this contract is higher than in ^hT ; which
in turn implies that r  c=(h;d). Therefore, since c=(l;e) < r  c=(h;d); the
contract ^ lT generates the right incentives for the low-quality agent.
We complete the proof by showing the limit result. Note that to establish
this result it is su¢ cient to show that the expected utility of the low-quality
agent from the contract ^hT stays bounded as T ! 1. To see this, it is enough
to show that as T !1, the low-quality agent who adopts ^hT exerts e¤ort in a
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nite number of (last) periods. Denote by K the rst period at which the agent
begins exerting e¤ort conditional on the task being easy. It is su¢ cient to show
that as T ! 1, the optimal strategy for the low-quality agent who adopts ^hT
is to start exerting e¤ort only if t  T   K; where K remains bounded even
if T ! 1. Assume by way of contradiction that this is not the case and that,
instead, K ! 1 as T ! 1: Observe however that whenever the agent exerts
e¤ort, it a¤ects his utility only if it is followed by an uninterrupted sequence of
successes. That is, if the agent succeeds in all remaining K periods (starting
from period (T  K) up to the end of the contracting period) he will, according
to ^hT ; receive a payment of
c
(h;d)
A(K) =
c
(h;d)

1
ph
K   1
1
ph
  1
and zero otherwise. Recall that for any strategy of the low-quality agent, the
probability of success in K tasks is less than or equal to
 
pl
K
. Since pl < ph,
the expected utility of the low-quality agent from any strategy in which he starts
exerting e¤ort in period T  K is bounded by
 c+ c
(h;d)
(l;e)
ph

pl
ph
K 1    plK 1
1
ph
  1
Since
lim
K!1
c
(h;d)
(l;e)
ph

pl
ph
K 1    plK 1
1
ph
  1 = 0,
we are done.
Observe that when T = 1 (the static problem) the optimal contract-pair is
actually pooling. That is,
^h1 (!) = ^
l
1 (!) =
(
c
(h;d)
if ! = f1g
0 otherwise
.
When T > 1 the contract-pair in which this pooling payment scheme is repeated
satises IC and EF . Theorem 1, however, shows that the dynamic structure
alleviates the screening problem of the principal and allows us to decrease the
low-quality agents information rents. The optimal contract uses the fact that
some histories are more likely to occur when the contract is chosen by the high-
quality agent, rather than the low-quality one, for any choice of e¤ort. Increasing
the payments assigned to these histories at the expense of the payments assigned
to the other histories makes this contract much less attractive to the low-quality
agent.
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Remark 4 The assumption has been that the principal can commit to long-term
contracts. If the principal can only commit to short-term one-period contracts,
then the optimal contract described in Theorem 1 in which the high-quality agent
is compensated only in the last period cannot be implemented simply because in
period T the principal has no incentive to pay more than what is necessary to
provide incentives to exert e¤ort in T . The high-quality agent, knowing this, will
not exert e¤ort in all periods t < T . Therefore, when the principal cannot make
a long-term commitment, he must pay the high-quality agent c(h;d) per success
every period.
Non-uniqueness
The optimal contract for the high-quality agent described in Theorem 1,
where he is compensated for success in period t only if he succeeds in all subse-
quent periods, looks rather extreme, especially when T is large. Not only does
this contract become very risky, but it also has the unpleasant feature that no
payment is guaranteed until T is reached. Of course, these features are irrele-
vant when the agent and the principal are both risk-neutral and do not discount
the future. In the next section discounting is introduced, yet it is comforting to
note that for T large enough, the contract described in Theorem 1 is not the
unique optimal contract and there are others in which these two features are
relaxed dramatically. The following corollary presents such an optimal contract
when the extreme form described above is used only during the last stages of
the contract. In particular, we construct a contract for the high-quality agent
in which during the rst T=2 periods he is compensated for a success in period
t if his subsequent success rate is at least  2 (0:5; 1], while during the last T=2
periods the contract is described as in Theorem 15: We start with a denition.
Denition 4 A proportional contract hT () is a contract that pays 
h
T (; !T )
after a history !T ; where hT (; !T ) consists of two parts. The rst part denes
the part of the payment that is due to successes in the rst half of the contract,
i.e., up to period T=2; while the second part denes the part of the payment that
is due to successes in periods T=2 onward: In particular,
hT (; !T ) =
dT=2eX
m=1
1fo(m)=1;n(T ) n(m)(T m 1)gB(m) +
c
(h;d)
A( eK(!T ))
where the 1fDg in the rst part is just an index function, o(m) is the outcome
of period m, n(t) is the number of successes from the beginning of the contract
until period t, and
B(m) =
c
(h;d)
1
T m 1P
j=d(T m 1)e
 
T m 1
j

(ph)
j
(1  ph)T m 1 j
.
5Of course, the choice of T=2 is arbitrary and as T gets larger; the part in which the original
contract is used can be reduced further.
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where
T m 1X
j=d(T m 1)e

T  m  1
j

ph
j 
1  ph
T m 1 j
is the ex-ante probability that a high-quality agent obtains a success rate of at
least  in all future periods, conditional on exerting e¤ort in all T   m   1
remaining periods. Finally, note that the second part of hT (; !T ) is just the
optimal contract dened in Theorem 1 restricted to periods T=2 onward, whereeK(!T ) = min fK(!T ); T=2g and K(!T ) is the longest uninterrupted sequence of
successes in !T starting from T and proceeding backward.
Note that this contract mimics the one dened in Theorem 1 for  = 1, while
for  = 0 this contract pays c(h;d) per success in every period during the rst
T=2 periods, regardless of the outcomes in other periods.
Corollary 2 For all  2 (0:5; 1) for which
pl

< (1  )1  ph (1)
there exists T^ () and a constant r > c=(l;e) such that, for all T > T^ (), the
contract-pair (hT () ; 
l
T ), where 
h
T () is the proportional contract described in
Denition 4 and  lT (!T ) = rn (!T ) ; is an optimal contract-pair.
The proof is provided at the end of Appendix A. Notice that since (1  )1  
is a monotone increasing function with lim!1 (1  )1   = 1 for any pl and
ph such that ph > pl there exists  2 (1=2; 1) such that for any  2 (; 1) the
inequality (1) holds.
In Corollary 2 it is shown that as long as T is large enough, there are other
optimal contracts that are not as extreme as the contract presented in Theorem
1. In this class of contracts payments are not postponed all the way to the
last period and the contracts are less risky than the one described in Theorem
1. The next section shows that introducing discounting pins down uniquely
the equilibrium payments. Moreover, since in the case of discounting delay of
payments is costly, this contract does not possess the described extreme features.
6 Discounting Future Payments
Up until now the assumption has been that the agents and the principal do
not discount the future (or alternatively, have the same discount factor). We
shall now relax this assumption to cover the case where the agents are more
impatient than the principal. Unlike in the case of no discounting, where timing
of payments is irrelevant and it can be assumed without loss of generality that
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Figure 3: Two-period contract for an impatient agent of type s, which species
for any possible histories !1 and !2 the payment to this agent,  s2 (!k).
all payments are postponed until the end of the contract, in the case here the
exact timing of payments is relevant and is part of the contract, as depicted in
the gure below for a two-period contract. With some abuse of notation, we
denote by  sT (!k) the payment to the in contract 
s
T of length T after history
!k of length k.
For ease of notation, we assume that the principal does not discount the
future and hence he has the same preferences as were assumed in the previous
sections, while the expected utility of the agent is
TX
t=1
t (mt   Ct)
where  2 (0; 1) is the agents discount factor and mt and Ct are his payment
and e¤ort level in period t.
Recall that the main insight from the no-discounting case was that the ex-
pected payment to the low-quality agent is reduced by employing the mecha-
nism of postponing paymentsaccording to which the contract of the high-quality
agent rewards successes only after a delay and only conditional on successes in
all periods in between. While this insight is carried over to the case here, now it
is costly because of the need to compensate the high-quality agent for the delay
in payments. As a result the mechanism of postponing payments is now used
selectively, i.e., not necessarily after every history, and not necessarily all the way
to the end. In other words, when the agents are impatient the principal faces a
trade-o¤; conditional on the agent being a low-quality one, posteponing payment
is benecial, while conditional on him being high-quality one, it is costly.
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When the agent is known to be a high-quality agent, the unique optimal
contract is the one that pays for success with no delay. More precisely, the
unique optimal contract pays c=(h;d) in period t if (and only if) the task at t
was successful. We refer to this contract as the base-line contract.
Denition 5 A T -period contract T is called the base-line contract if
T (!k) =
(
c=(h;d) if o(k) = 1
0 otherwise
where o(k) is the outcome in period k.
We denote by Cst
 
^hT ; !t 1; pt

the action taken according to the optimal
strategy of an agent of type s in period t when the contract is ^hT ; the history is
!t 1; and at t the tasks type is pt. Indeed, it is easy to verify that a contract-pair
in which the base-line contract is o¤ered to both types of agents is admissible.
Note, however, that this contract-pair is not optimal (provided that the discount
factor is not too small), because it pays, in expectation, too much to the low-
quality agent. The following proposition is a straightforward extension of the
arguments developed in the no-discounting case and as such is provided here with
no proof. It asserts that the high-quality agent should be indi¤erent between
the optimal contract ^hT and the base-line contract, while the low-quality agent
should be indi¤erent between his contract ^ lT and the contract for the high-
quality agent, ^hT . However, discounting implies that all the expected utility
of the low-quality agent is moved up-front and paid at the moment of signing
the contract. Recall that ul(^ ; sub?) is the expected (discounted) utility of the
low-quality agent from the contract ^ .
Proposition 1 When the agents are impatient and they discount future pay-
ments at some rate  < 1; then the optimal contract-pair (^hT ; ^
l
T ) is such that:
(i) the high-quality agent is indi¤erent between his contract ^hT and the base-
line contract, (ii) the contract ^hT is constructed from the base-line contract by
employing the mechanism of postponing payments selectively (not after every his-
tory, and not necessarily until the end of the contract), and (iii) the contract ^ lT
pays an up-front amount M = ul(^hT ; sub?) and then c=(l;e) at t if the task at t
is successful.
Two remarks are in order:
Remark 5 The mechanism of postponing payments is more e¤ective (and less
costly) if employed after histories that are more likely to occur if the agent is of
low quality. These histories are more likely to be found later in the life of the
contract than earlier. However, because the agent is impatient, the mechanism is
more e¤ective the earlier it is employed. The optimal ^hT balances between these
two forces that are, to some extent, in conict.
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Below we develop a three-period example in which the mechanism of post-
poning payments is employed only after histories that are more likely to occur
when the agent is of low quality. We then show that if the discount factor is
smaller than the probability of failure of the high-quality agent then it pays to
employ the mechanism sooner rather than later. The intuition for this result
is that the lower a high-quality agents ex-ante probability of success is, i.e.,
ph = q(h;d) + (1  q)(h;l); the more di¢ cult it becomes to use failure as a cri-
terion for identifying which histories are more likely to occur when the agent is
of low-quality.
Remark 6 The longer a payment is postponed, the more costly it is. It follows
that when a payment is postponed, it may not be postponed all the way to period
T . Indeed, it is never optimal to postpone a payment longer than is needed to
eliminate the incentives of the low-quality agent to exert e¤ort in t if he accepts
the contract. Postponing payments further is of no benet on the one hand, and
is costly on the other.
The nal result of this section is a limiting result that corresponds to the
case as  ! 1: It is shown that as the cost of postponing payments is decreasing,
payments for success in period t are postponed as long as the incentives of
the low-quality agent to exert e¤ort in t remain positive. For simplicity, we
shall assume in the sequel that (l;d) is small enough so that it is never optimal
for a low-quality agent to exert e¤ort when the task is di¢ cult.6 Relaxing this
assumption would add no qualitative insight and would complicate the discussion
considerably.
6.1 Three-period Example
In this section we construct an example of a three-period optimal contract in
which, according to ^hT ; if in period one the task is successful, then c=(h;d) is
paid in every subsequent period in which the respective task is successful. If,
however, the rst task ended in failure, then the payment for success in period
two is postponed and paid only in period three and only if the third task is also
successful. The contract ^ l3; on the other hand, pays an amount M up-front
and then c=(l;e) at t if (and only if) the task at t was successful. The lump
sum M is the minimal amount required to satisfy the IC constraint and it is
6More precisely, we assume that
 c+ (l;d) c
(h;d)
A(T ) < 0
which is equivalent to
(l;d) < (h;d)
1
ph
  1
1
ph
T
  1
.
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the expected utility of the low-quality agent should he accept contract ^hT . The
intuition behind this equilibrium is that postponing payments in ^hT is costly
to the principal because the high-quality agent must be compensated for the
delay in payments; indeed, the sole purpose of postponement of payment is to
make the contract less attractive to the low-quality agent. A failure in the
rst period is more likely to occur when the agent is of low-quality, and as the
example demonstrates, there are parameters under which it pays to wait for such
histories and to postpone payments, even though waiting renders this mechanism
less e¤ective due to the discounting of future utilities.
To establish the optimality of ^h3 ; note rst that regardless of the history
a success in period three is rewarded by c=(h;d), which is the minimal amount
required to provide the needed incentives to exert e¤ort when the task is di¢ cult.
Proceeding backward to period two, consider rst the optimal policy after a
failure in the rst period. For the high-quality agent to exert e¤ort when the
task is di¢ cult he must be compensated for success with the equivalent of the
c=(h;d) paid in this period. Note that postponing a payment of " for one period
requires increasing the next period payment by "=. Therefore, following a failure
in period one and a success in period two, the expected cost of postponing a
payment of " to period three and paying conditional on success in that period is
(1  )

1  ph

"
1  

where (1   ) is the prior that the agent is of high-quality, and (1   ph) is the
probability of him failing in the rst period (i.e., the probability of reaching
this history when the agents quality is high). The benet of this delay is the
reduction in the utility of the low-quality agent (probability ). The utility
reduction of the low-quality agent due to this change given that he failed in the
rst period is
2(1  q)(l;e)"  3(1  q)2
 
(l;e)
2 "
ph
where "=
 
ph

is the increased payment due to delayed payment of ". Since the
low-quality agent reaches this history with probability q+(1  q)(1 (l;e)), the
expected utility reduction of the low-quality agent due to this change is
2
 
q + (1  q)(1  (l;e)

)(1  q)(l;e)

"   (1  q)(l;e)
ph
"

:
Therefore, after a failure in period one, postponing a payment for success from
period two to period three and paying conditional on success in period three is
benecial if
2
 
q + (1  q)(1  (l;e)

)(1 q)(l;e)

1  (1  q)(l;e)
ph

> (1  )

1  ph
 1  

:
(2)
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Similarly, the cost of postponing a payment of " from the rst period to the
second is
(1  ) "1  

and the benet is
(1  q)(l;e)

"   (1  q)(l;e)
ph
"

.
Therefore, it is protable to postpone payments from the rst period to the
second if
(1  q)(l;e)

1  (1  q)(l;e)
ph

> (1  ) 1  

. (3)
We conclude from (2) and (3) that if
2
 
q + (1  q)(1  (l;e)

)(1 q)(l;e)

1  (1  q)(l;e)
ph

 (1  )

1  ph
 1  

> 0
and
(1  q)(l;e)

1  (1  q)(l;e)
ph

  (1  ) 1  

 0
then success in the rst period results in no postponement of payment for success
in subsequent periods, but failure in the rst period results in the delaying of
payment in the second period.
In Appendix C we show that these two inequalities can coexist in the sense
that there exists a range of parameters in which both inequalities hold.
Remark 7 In general, the protability of postponing payments is decreasing with
the length of the delay because the benets are decreasing and the costs are in-
creasing with the length of delay. In particular, in the example above, if it is
not protable to postpone payments from the rst period to the second, then it is
not protable to postpone payments from the rst period to the third. Moreover,
postponing payment at some period a¤ects incentives in that period as well as in
previous periods.
Remark 8 It is apparent from the calculation in this example that the benets
and the costs of postponing payments from period t to period t0 > t are linear in
the amount being postponed as long as it has no e¤ect on the incentives of the
low-quality agent to exert e¤ort in period t00  t. In the example above, it implies
that if it is protable to transfer, say, some amount " from period one to period
two, then it is optimal to transfer minfc=(h;d); kg where k is the transfer that
makes the low-quality agent indi¤erent between exerting and not exerting e¤ort
on an easy task in period one, given that success is compensated by c=(h;d)   k
in this period, and conditional on success in period two an additional payment
of k=ph is paid.
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6.2 Intermediate Discount Factor
As we explained earlier, in postponing payments the principal faces a trade-o¤.
Later in the life of the contract it is easier to identify histories that are more
likely to occur when the agent is of low-quality, and hence these histories are
good times to postpone payments. But because agent discounts future payments,
postponing payments later in the life of the contract is less e¤ective. So whether
payments are postponed early or late in the contract depends on how easy it
is to identify goodhistories and on how impatient the agent is. Indeed, the
following proposition, whose proof is provided in Appendix C, establishes that if
the rate of discounting is small relative to the ex-ante probability of the failure
of the high-quality agent, then payments are postponed starting from period
one. The intuition for this result is that the lower a high-quality agents ex-ante
probability of success is, i.e., ph = q(h;d) + (1   q)(h;l); the more di¢ cult it
becomes to use failure as a criterion for identifying which histories are more likely
to occur when the agent is of low-quality.
Proposition 2 If  < 1   ph; then it is optimal to postpone payments in the
initial periods of the contract. That is, for any history !t in whose nal period
the agent succeeds, there exists k!t such that for all t < k!t we have ^
h
T (!t) = 0;
and for all t  k!t we have ^hT (!t) > 0.
6.3 High Discount Factor and Limit Result
When, as was assumed in previous sections, agents do not discount future pay-
ments, postponing payments is costless and hence a contract for the high-quality
agent in which all payments are postponed to the end is optimal. Yet, as was
shown above, even in the case of no discounting, this may not be the unique
optimal contract. In particular, when payment is postponed until after every
history but only as long as the low-quality agent nds it optimal to exert e¤ort
when the task is easy, the resulting contract-pair is also optimal. We now show
that when the agents are impatient but the discount factor is close enough to
one, this contract is still optimal.
We start with a simple lemma that asserts that for a signicantly high dis-
count factor, if the optimal contract for the high-quality agent, ^hT , is such
that the low-quality agent, if he to adopt this contract, exerts e¤ort in period
t 2 f1; :::; Tg when the task is easy, then all payments for successes at t are
postponed to future periods.
Lemma 4 There exists  < 1 such that for all  2 [; 1] and for all histories
!t 1 that
1. can be reached with positive probability when the low-quality agent sign into
contract ^hT and choose a best reponseaccording,
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2. C lt
 
^hT ; !t 1; e

= c;
we have ^hT (!t 1; 1) = 0.
Proof. To establish the lemma it is enough to show that for all histories !t 1
that can be reached in positive probability by the low-quality agent when he sign
into ^hT and C
l
t
 
^hT ; !t 1; e

= c; if ^hT (!t 1; 1) > 0 then, for  high enough it is
benecial for the principal to postpone the payment ^hT (!t 1; 1). Observe rst
that in a history that contains l successes and m failures, the cost of postponing
the amount " for one period and paying conditional on success is
(1  )

ph
l 
1  ph
m
"
1  

!
!1
0:
Next recall that since the amount " is paid only after an additional success, the
benet of postponing payment of it is the reduction in the expected utility of
the low-quality agent if he accepts the contract ^hT .
If the low-quality agent exerts e¤ort after history !t 1 and exerts e¤ort also
in the next period if an easy task arrives, then the benet of the change for the
principal is

 
q + (1  q)  1  (l;e)r (1  q)l  (l;e)l m+l+1


(1  q)  (l;e) "  (1  q)2  (l;e)2 "(ph)

!
!1
a > 0
where m   r is the number of periods along the history !t 1 where the low-
quality agent does not exert e¤ort even if an easy task arrives. If the low-quality
agent does not exert e¤ort in period t+1 following the history !t 1 and success
at t even when an easy task arrives, then the benet of the the change for the
principal is

 
q + (1  q)  1  (l;e)r (1  q)l  (l;e)l m+l+1 (1  q)  (l;e) " !
!1
b > 0.
It follows that if ^hT is such that if the low-quality agent adopts it, then he exerts
e¤ort at t whenever the task at t is easy, then the payment for success in t
according to ^hT must be zero.
Since payment in t is positive only when the task in period t is accomplished
successfully, the previous lemma implies that if the low-quality agent exerts e¤ort
in period t (when the task is easy) and succeeds, then he must also exert e¤ort
in period t+ 1 when the task is easy.
The following proposition establishes that for a discount factor close enough
to one, the optimal contract-pair
 
^hT ; ^
l
T

is such that if the low-quality agent
deviates, adopts the contract ^hT ; and then chooses a best response, then there
exists some k  T such that for all t < k the agent does not exert e¤ort, but
thereafter, for t  k; he exerts e¤ort whenever the task is easy. It follows from
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the lemma that the contract ^hT can be split into two time intervals. In the rst
k  1 periods, a success in t is compensated at some t0  T , while compensation
for success in period t  k is paid at the end of the contract, i.e., in period T .
Proposition 3 There exists  < 1 such that for any  2 [; 1] there exists a
period k such that, in the optimal contract-pair
 
^hT ; ^
l
T

; C lt
 
^hT ; !t 1; e

= 0 if
t < k and o(m) =  1 for any m < t and C lt
 
^hT ; !t 1; e

= c if t  k.
Proof. To establish the proposition it is enough to show that if the low-quality
agent exerts e¤ort in some period t when an easy task arrives, then he also exerts
e¤ort in period t+1 when an easy task arrives regardless of the outcome in period
t. Denote by k the rst period where the low-quality agent, if he accepts ^hT ;
exerts e¤ort when an easy task arrives. It follows that until period k the agent
experiences a sequence of failures.
Assume, by way of contradiction, that there exists some period l  k such
that the agent exerts e¤ort in l if an easy task arrives, but does not exert e¤ort in
period l+1 even if an easy task arrives. Observe rst that if the agent succeeds
in period l, the previous lemma implies that the payment for this success is
postponed. Thus, compensation for exerting e¤ort in l is paid only if the task
in l + 1 is successful, which implies that the agent must exert e¤ort in period
l + 1 after success in l; when the task in l + 1 is an easy task, or otherwise
he shouldnt exert e¤ort in l. In fact, it implies that after an uninterrupted
sequence of successes starting from period l he should exert e¤ort whenver the
task is easy. Hence, it remains to show that it is optimal for the low-quality
agent, if he adopts ^hT , to exert e¤ort in period l+1 even after he fails in period
l. Assume next that after failure in period l the low-quality agent does not exert
e¤ort in period l+1 when the task is easy. Note, however, that there must exist
a period m > l such that the low-quality agent exerts e¤ort in m whenever the
task is easy (and continues doing so as long as he succeeds), but he does not
exert e¤ort on an easy task in period m   1: To see this, note that it is always
optimal for the low-quality agent to exert e¤ort on an easy task in period T:
Recall that our agent exerts e¤ort in period k and, if successful, is compen-
sated by c
T k(h;d)(ph)
T k in period T with probability (1  q)T k
 
(l;e)
T k. It
follows that
(l;e)
c
(h;d) (ph)
T k (1  q)T k
 
(l;e)
T k   c  0:
However, since k < m  1 and ph > (1  q)(l;e); we have that
 c+ c
(h;d) (ph)
T m+1(l;e) (1  q)T m+1
 
(l;e)
T m+1
>
 c+ c
(h;d) (ph)
T k (l;e) (1  q)T k
 
(l;e)
T k  0.
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We conclude that if the low-quality agent exerted e¤ort in period k when an easy
task arrived, he should exert e¤ort in period m  1 as well, a contradiction.
An immediate consequence of the proposition above is that when  > ; the
optimal contract ^hT possesses similar features as in the case of no discounting
characterized in previous sections. That is, payments are postponed as long as
the incentives for the low-quality agent to exert e¤ort are positive. Moreover, in
the history that contains k   1 failures, all the payments are postponed to the
last period, where k is dened as the minimal K for which
(l;e)
c
(h;d) (ph)
T K (1  q)T K
 
(l;e)
T K   c  0.
6.4 Uniqueness
When agents do not discount future payments the set of optimal contracts may
not be unique. In particular, if it is enough to eliminate incentives for the
low-quality agent to exert e¤ort in period t when the payments in period t are
postponed to period t0 > t (and paid conditional on successes in between), then
postponing payments even further to t" > t0 is also optimal. Yet, this is not
the case when agents are impatient. Indeed, we shall now show that introducing
impatience narrows down the set of equilibrium payments to a unique one. More
precisely, the following proposition establishes the uniqueness of the optimal
contract under the assumption that the payments to the high-quality agent are
zero after all histories that include a refusal to accept a task at least once. Since
any optimal contract-pair is admissible, a high-quality agent will never refuse
a task in equilibrium. Hence, the proposition implies uniqueness of payments
along the equilibrium path. In particular, there exist other optimal contract-
pairs in which o¤-equilibrium payments, i.e., payments after histories containing
refusals, are di¤erent.
Proposition 4 When agents discount the future at the rate  2 (0; 1); then
the optimal contract-pair
bhT ;b lT is generically unique among all contracts in
which a refusal to accept a task by the high-quality agent in period t 2 f1; :::; Tg
leads to a payment of zero in all periods t0  t.
Proof. To prove this, we need to recall rst from Proposition (1) that if the
pair
 
^hT ; ^
l
T

is optimal, then the high-quality agent is indi¤erent between his
contract ^hT and the base-line contract. Recall, too, that the contract for the
low-quality agent pays an up-front lump sum M and subsequently for all t 2
f1; :::; Tg; pays c=(l;e) at t if and only if the task at t is accomplished successfully.
WhenM = Ul(^hT ), the expected discounted utility of the low-quality agent from
the contract is ^hT : Also recall that m
s
 
 iT ; sub?

denotes the expected payment
to an agent of quality s in contract  iT .
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The principal is indi¤erent between the two contract-pairs
 
hT ; 
l
T

andbhT ;b lT if and only if both pairs are admissible and, moreover,
ml

 lT ; sub?

+(1  )mh

hT ; sub?

= ml
b lT ; sub?+(1  )mh bhT ; sub? .
Recall from Proposition 1 that the expected payment to the low-quality agent
in the pairs
 
^hT ; ^
l
T

and
 
hT ; 
l
T

is
T (1  q)(l;e)
c
(l;e)
+ ul(^hT ; sub?) and T (1  q)(l;e)
c
(l;e)
+ ul(hT ; sub?):
We conclude that the principal is indi¤erent between the two contract-pairs 
hT ; 
l
T

and
bhT ;b lT if and only if both pairs are admissible and, moreover,
ul(hT ; sub?)+(1  )mh

hT ; sub?

= ul(^hT ; sub?)+(1  )mh
bhT ; sub? :
To establish generic uniqueness of the optimal contract-pair, we now show
that if two admissible contract-pairs
 
hT ; 
l
T

and
bhT ;b lT are optimal, then
there is only a measure zero of prior beliefs  on which the principal is indi¤erent
between the two contract-pairs:
From Proposition 1 it follows that the optimal contract to the high-quality
agent generates an expected utility of
 c+ ph c
(h;d)
 TX
t=1
t:
Given all this, it is not di¢ cult to show that there is a nite number of contracts
that can be considered optimal. Recall that if the principal postpones some of
the payments in the contract of the high-quality agent, he pays them condi-
tional on observing an uninterrupted sequence of successes until the payment
periods. Therefore the payment to the high-quality agent consists of two parts:
the expected payment (ignoring delay) Tph c(h;d) ; and the additional payment for
compensation for delays. The additional expected payment to the high-quality
agent if, following a history of l successes and m failures, a payment of " is post-
poned for k periods and the amount of "=
 
ph
k
is paid for k successes, is given
by 
ph
l 
1  ph
m
"

1
k
  1

:
For a given strategy of the low-quality agent the decrease in his payment, if he
adopts the contract for the high-quality agent, is given by
Pr (l;m)
 
(l;e)
l
m+l+1
"
(1  q)  (l;e) "  (1  q)k+1  (l;e)k+1 "
(ph)
k
#
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where Pr (l;m) is the probability that the low-quality agent will reach this his-
tory. If the low-quality agent stops exerting e¤ort even if an easy agent arrives,
the decrease in his utility is
Pr (l;m)
 
(l;e)
l
m+l+1 (1  q)  (l;e) ":
Thus, for a given strategy of the low-quality agent, the change in the expected
payment to the high-quality agent and the change in the expected utility of the
low-quality agent are linear in the postponed amount. Therefore, if the principal
nds it optimal to postpone some amount of money after some history, he will
postpone either the maximal amount or the amount that changes the strategy
of the low-quality agent. Since the low-quality agent has a nite number of
strategies, and there is a nite number of potential postponements available for
the principal, there is a nite number of priors  that satisfy the indi¤erence of
the principal.
7 Conclusion and Extensions
Risk Aversion
Throughout this paper, we have assumed that the principal and the agent
are both risk-neutral. The assumption of risk neutrality simplies the analysis
considerably, but it is also important to note that the analysis of the case where
the agent is more risk-averse than the principal is qualitatively similar to the
one conducted above for the discounting case. In particular, the same important
trade-o¤ identied for the case where the agents are impatient is present here.
Postponing payments in the contract designed for the high-quality agent is the
way to reduce expected payments to the low-quality agent. However, conditional
on the agent being of high-quality, postponing payment is costly because the
agent, being risk averse, must be compensated for the extra risk. It follows that
adding risk aversion to the model with discounting has largely the same e¤ect
as reducing the discount factor.
Pooling
Throughout this paper, we have assumed that (l;e) > (h;d) and relegated to
Appendix B the rather similar analysis of the case where (l;e)  (h;d) (hereafter
cases (i) and (ii) respectively). It is, however, worth describing the main result of
case (ii) and providing some intuition for the sharp di¤erences between the two
cases and in particular for the fact that in case (ii) the optimal contract-pair is
pooling, in the sense that regardless of the agents type, he is paid a xed amount
c=(h;d) per success, as is shown in Theorem 2 in Appendix B. Recall that in case
(i) the contract that is o¤ered to the high-quality agent is the one that is o¤ered
to him when his quality is observable, and it is the low-quality agent who enjoys
some information rent. As we establish in Appendix B, case (ii) is di¤erent. The
rst di¤erence is that in this case the high-quality agent enjoys the information
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rent from his privately known type (in addition he has information rents from
privately observed types of tasks), and the second di¤erence is that now the
repeated nature of the relation is not helpful.
To gain some insight into the di¤erences between the two cases, assume rst
that in every t 2 f1; :::; Tg the principal is constrained to propose a short-term
one-period contract only. It is easy to see that in both cases the only contract-
pair that satises EF and IC is a pooling one in which regardless of the agents
quality he is paid a xed amount per success: c=(h;d) in case (i), and c=(l;e)
in case (ii): Adopting the terminology developed above for long-term contracts,
and letting n (!T ) denote the number of successes in !T ; these contracts can be
written as
Case (i): hT (!T ) = 
l
T (!T ) =
c  n (!T )
(h;d)
and
Case (ii): ~hT (!T ) = ~
l
T (!T ) =
c  n (!T )
(l;e)
:
Note that hT (!T ) 2  hT and ~ lT (!T ) 2  lT ; which implies that in case (i) the
expected utility of the high-quality agent is at its lower bound (at its level when
his quality is observable), while the expected utility of the low-quality agent
is above its lower bound. The reverse, however, is true in case (ii), where the
expected utility of the low-quality agent is at its lower bound.
As we show in the analysis of case (i) above, the important e¤ect of long-
term contracts is the availability of other contracts in  hT which, from the low-
quality agents point of view, are worse than hT (!T ). The optimal contract-pair
exploits this by assigning the high-quality agent the contract in  hT that is the
least attractive to the low-quality agent. This enables the principal to assign to
the low-quality agent a contract that yields a lower expected payment than the
repeated short-term contract  lT (!T ) : In case (ii) it is the high-quality agent
who receives a level of expected utility above his lower bound. But unlike in
case (i) where the short-term contract hT (!T ) was, for the low-quality agent,
the best in  hT ; now the short-term contract ~
l
T (!T ) is the worst in  
l
T for the
high-quality agent. It follows that in case (ii) the short-term contract is the best
the principal can achieve when the low-quality agent is already at his IR, because
any other contract Tl that satises EF would yield the high-quality agent an
even higher expected utility.
8 Appendix A: Proofs for the Separating Contract
Case
Proof of Lemma 1:
Property 1: Assume that this property is false. hK 2  hK , so hK provides
su¢ cient incentives in all subgames, and in particular in sub 1 (the subgame
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following a failure in period one). Consider replacing hK with ~
h
K , where ~
h
K is
obtained by amending the contract hK and replacing the payments in all histories
that belong to sub 1 by payments in one of the optimal K   1-period contracts
in  hK 1. That is, ~
h
K ( 1; !K 1) = ~hK 1 (!K 1). Clearly, the proposed change
does not a¤ect incentives in sub1. Also, because an optimalK 1-period contract
provides incentives in theK 1-period problem, incentives are provided in sub 1.
Since the new payment scheme in sub 1 is a contract in  hK 1; it minimizes
expected payments in all schemes that provide incentives. That is,
mh(~hK ; sub 1) < m
h(hK ; sub 1) (4)
because otherwise the K payments restricted to sub 1 is a contract from  hK 1:
Since incentives are provided by hK to exert e¤ort in period one on a task with
a major problem, it must be the case that
uh(hK ; sub1)  uh(hK ; sub 1) 
c
(h;d)
and in particular
mh(hK ; sub1) mh(hK ; sub 1) 
c
(h;d)
: (5)
This together with (4) implies that
uh(hK ; sub1)  uh(~hK ; sub 1) >
c
(h;d)
which guarantees that incentives to exert e¤ort in period one are preserved and
in general incentives are provided in the revised K-period contract. Finally, note
that since this revision decreases the expected utility of the agent after failure
in the rst period and keeps the expected utility after success in the rst period,
it decreases the expected payment, which is in contradiction to the claimed
optimality of the original contract.
Property 2: Assume by way of contradiction that hK 2  hK ; but that
uh(hK ; sub1)  uh(hK ; sub 1) 6=
c
(h;d)
and recall that since an optimal contract provides incentives to exert e¤ort, it
must be the case that
uh(hK ; sub1)  uh(hK ; sub 1) >
c
(h;d)
:
Therefore, we revise hK to ~
h
K so that ~
h
K (1; !K 1) = 
h
K ( 1; !K 1)+ c(h;d) .
Note that incentives to exert e¤ort in ~hK are kept and that u
h(hK ; sub1) is now
decreased to uh(hK ; sub 1)+
c
(h;d)
so that expected payment is decreased, which
is in contradiction to hK being optimal.
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Property 3: The proof is done by induction. Observe rst that for T = 1
we have h1 (1) =
c
(h;d)
and h1 ( 1) = 0; which implies that mh
 
h1 ; sub?

=
ph c(h;d)
. Next assume that if hK 1 2  hK 1; thenmh
 
hK 1; sub?

= (K   1) ph c(h;d) .
From Properties 1 and 2 it follows that
mh

hK ; sub?

= (1  ph)(K   1)ph c
(h;d)
+ ph[(K   1)ph c
(h;d)
+
c
(h;d)
] =
= Kph
c
(h;d)
;
which is the desired nal step of the proof.
Note that taken together, Properties 1, 2, and 3 imply that in any optimal
contract we have
mh

hK ; sub1

= (K   1) phc=(h;d) + c=(h;d).
Denote by uhT the expected utility of the high-quality agent from any contract
in  hT . That is,
uhT = Tp
h c
(h;d)
  Tc:
Property 4: This property is an immediate consequence of the following
claim:
Claim 2 If a T -period contract hT satises EF and IR and generates expected
utility u > uhT , then for any ~u 2 [uhT ; u) there exists another T -period contractehT that satises EF and IR and generates an expected utility of eu. Moreover,
for all !T 2 
T , ~hT (!T )  hT (!T ) with at least one strict inequality.
Proof. The proof is done by inducting on the contracts length, T . Assume
that T = 1 and observe that since h1 satises e¢ ciency, we have
h1 (1)  h1 ( 1) 
c
(h;d)
.
Moreover,
phh1 (1) +

1  ph

h1 ( 1)  c = u.
Consider two cases.
Case 1. h1 ( 1)  u  eu. In this case, we set eh1 (!1) = h1 (!1)  (u  eu) for
!1 2 f1; 1g. It can be easily veried that the new contract satises EF and
IR and generates an expected utility of eu; and for any !1 2 f1; 1g we haveeh1 (!1) < h1 (!1).
Case 2. h1 ( 1) < u   eu. In this case set eh1 ( 1) = 0 and eh1 (1) = eu+cph <
u+c (1 ph)h1 ( 1)
ph
= h1 (1) ; where the inequality follows from the fact that in this
case u   eu > h1 ( 1). Since eu  uh1 , incentives are preserved. Moreover, the
34
contract eh1 generates an expected utility of eu and for any !1 2 f1; 1g we haveeh1 (!1)  h1 (!1). This complete the proof for T = 1.
Having established the claim for T = 1, we proceed by assuming that the
statement holds for T = K 1 periods and we show that it holds for T = K peri-
ods. Assume that there exists aK-period contract hK for which u
h
 
hK ; sub?

>
uhK . As in the case of T = 1, we consider two cases.
Case 1. uh
 
hK ; sub 1
   uhK 1  u   eu. In this case consider two K   1-
period contracts hK 1; 1 and 
h
K 1;1 that satises EF and IR such that
1. uh

hK 1; 1; sub?

= uh
 
hK ; sub 1
  (u  eu) and uh hK 1;1; sub? =
uh
 
hK ; sub1
  (u  eu)
2. hK ( 1; !K 1)  hK 1; 1 (!K 1) and hK (1; !K 1)  hK 1;1 (!K 1)
Since uh
 
hK ; sub 1
  (u  eu)  uhK 1 and uh  hK ; sub1  (u  eu)  uhK 1,
the induction argument guarantees the existence of such contracts. Construct a
contract ehK , such that ehK (1; !K 1) = hK 1;1 (!K 1) and ehK ( 1; !K 1) =
hK 1; 1 (!K 1) for any !K 1 2 
K 1. First, notice that by construction,
the incentives in any subgame after the rst period are guaranteed. Second,
since uh
 
hK ; sub1
 uh  hK ; sub 1 = uh ehK ; sub1 uh ehK ; sub 1, the rst-
period incentives are preserved. The expected utility of the high-quality agent
is given by phuh
ehK ; sub1+  1  phuh ehK ; sub 1  c = eu. Finally, by con-
struction, for all !K 2 
K we have ~hK(!K)  hK(!K); where the inequality is
strict for at least one !K 2 
K .
Case 2. uh
 
hK ; sub 1
 uhK 1 < u eu. Consider twoK 1-period contracts
that satisfy EF and IR hK 1; 1 and 
h
K 1;1 such that u
h

hK 1; 1; sub?

=
uhK 1 and u
h

hK 1;1; sub?

=
eu+c (1 ph)uhK 1
ph
<
u+c (1 ph)uh(hK ;sub 1)
ph
=
uh
 
hK ; sub1

; where the inequality follows from the fact that in this case uh
 
hK ; sub 1
 
uhK 1 < u  eu. Since
phuh

hK 1;1; sub?

+

1  ph

uh

hK 1; 1; sub?

= eu+c > uhK+c > uhK 1+c
and uh

hK 1; 1; sub?

= uhK 1 we get that u
h

hK 1;1; sub?

> uhK 1. The
induction argument guarantees the existence of the contracts with the required
properties. As in the previous case we construct a contract ehK from two K   1-
period contracts, hK 1; 1 and 
h
K 1;1; such that ehK (1; !K 1) = hK 1;1 (!K 1)
and ehK ( 1; !K 1) = hK 1; 1 (!K 1) for any !K 1 2 
K 1. The rest of the
proof is similar to the proof of Case 1.
Proof of Lemma 2:
Consider rst the set  h1 of one-period optimal contracts. Because e¤ort is
not veriable, incentives must be provided to induce e¤ort even when p1 = d;
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where the probability of success is low. It follows that incentives to exert e¤ort
on all tasks are provided if and only if h1(1)  h1( 1)  c=(h;d). We conclude
that  h1 is a singleton and 
h
1 2  h1 if and only if h1(1) = c=(h;d) and h1( 1) = 0;
which establishes (i) in the statement of the lemma. To complete the proof, note
that Property 1 in Lemma 1 shows (ii.1) and to establish (ii.2) it is enough to
show that for every hK 2  hK there exists a contract ~hK 1 2  hK 1 such that for
any history !K 1 we have ~hK 1 (!K 1)  hK (1; !K 1). This, however, follows
from Property 4 in Lemma 1.
Proof of Claim 1. The proof is done by induction on T; the length of the
contract. For T = 1, the statement holds trivially. We assume then that the
statement holds for T = K and next prove it for T = K + 1. Denote by ~hK+1
the contract that
1. yields a utility of uhK+1 + ~u to the high-quality agent
2. induces sub contracts on sub1 and sub 1 that are the contracts described
in point 1 of Theorem 1 amended by some non-negative extra payments  1
in sub1 and   1 in sub 1; that are paid after a history of K uninterrupted
successes.
First note that it is always possible to nd  1 and   1 such that: (i)
uh(~hK+1; sub?) = u
h
K+1 + ~u; (ii) the incentives for the high-quality agent are
preserved (for example by choosing   1 = 0), and (iii) by the induction argu-
ment, ~hK+1 minimizes the expected utility of the low-quality agent in each of
these subgames in all contracts that generate an expected utility of uhK+(p
h)K 1
and uhK + (p
h)K  1; respectively.
It is left for us to show that   1 = 0: Assume by way of contradiction that
  1 > 0 and consider decreasing   1 (the payment after a failure following
a sequence of K successes) by " > 0 and increasing  1 (the payment after a
sequence of K + 1 successes) by " p
h
1 ph . Note that this change does not a¤ect
the expected utility of the high-quality agent, preserves his incentives and for
anydecrease the utilioty of the low-quality agent by ".
Proof of Corollary 2. We rst show that the contract described in Denition 4
is an optimal contract for the high-quality agent. To see this, observe that in this
contract the expected compensation for success in each period is c(h;d) . It follows
that this contract provides the high-quality agent with the same expected utility
as did the original contract described in Theorem 1 and it generates e¢ cient
incentives. We next show that there exists a threshold T^ () so that if T > T^ (),
the contract yields the same expected utility for the low-quality agent as the one
for the high-quality agent described in Theorem 1. It is enough to establish that
if the low-quality agent adopts this contract then his best strategy is to exert
no e¤ort during the rst T=2 periods. We now show now that for any period
m 2 f1; :::T=2g ; if the low-quality agent does not succeed in all t < m periods,
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his expected utility is higher if he does not exert e¤ort in period m. Since his
probability of success in any period is bounded by pl, the change in his expected
utility if he exerts e¤ort at period m 2 f1; :::T=2g is bounded by
 c+ (l;e)
c
(h;d)
T m 1P
j=d(T m 1)e
 
T m 1
j
  
pl
j  
1  plT m 1 j
T m 1P
j=d(T m 1)e
 
T m 1
j

(ph)
j
(1  ph)T m 1 j
.
To show that this expression is negative for T big enough, it is enough to show
that
lim
T!1
T m 1P
j=d(T m 1)e
 
T m 1
j
  
pl
j  
1  plT m 1 j
T m 1P
j=d(T m 1)e
 
T m 1
j

(ph)
j
(1  ph)T m 1 j
= 0.
Note that
T m 1P
j=d(T m 1)e
 
T m 1
j
  
pl
j  
1  plT m 1 j
T m 1P
j=d(T m 1)e
 
T m 1
j

(ph)
j
(1  ph)T m 1 j

T m 1P
j=d(T m 1)e
 
T m 1
j
  
pl
j  
1  plT m 1 j
(ph)
T m 1

 
T m 1
d(T m 1)e
  
pl
d(T m 1)e
(1  ) (T  m  1)
(ph)
T m 1
where the rst inequality follows from the fact that
 
ph
T m 1
is just one of
the elements in summation. The second inequality follows from (i) pl 2 (0; 1)
and (ii). For   1=2 the monotonicity of the binomial coe¢ cient implies that 
T m 1
d(T m 1)e
   T m 1j  for any j 2 fd (T  m  1)e ; :::; T  m  1g.
By Stanica (2001; Corollary 2.3), it follows that for   1=2; the binomial
coe¢ cient is bounded by
T  m  1
d (T  m  1)e

 1p
2 (1  ) (T  m  1)
 
1

T m 1 
1
   1
(T m 1)(1 ) .
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Plugging this bound into the previous expression yields 
T m 1
d(T m 1)e
  
pl
d(T m 1)e
(1  ) (T  m  1)
(ph)
T m 1

p
(1  ) (T  m  1)p
2
 
1

 
pl
 
1
   1
(1 )
ph
!T m 1
=
p
(1  ) (T  m  1)p
2
  
pl
   1
   1

(1  ) ph
!T m 1
Therefore, for
 
pl
   1
   1

< (1  ) ph we have
lim
T!1
p
(1  ) (T  m  1)p
2
  
pl
   1
   1

(1  ) ph
!T m 1
= 0
which completes the proof.
9 Appendix B: The Pooling Contract-pair
In this appendix we turn our attention to the second case, where (l;e)  (h;d):
We solve for the optimal contract in this case similarly to how we solved for
the optimal contract in the rst case, where (l;e) > (h;d). That is, we start
by assuming that the agent is known to be of low-quality, and dene the set of
optimal contracts  lT . After characterizing  
l
T ; we drop the assumption that the
agent is known to be of low-quality and show that when the agents quality is
unobservable the contract-pair (hT ; 
l
T ) is optimal only if 
l
T 2  lT . Equipped
with this result, it is rather easy to characterize the optimal contract pair (hT ; 
l
T )
and show that hT   lT .
9.1 Agents Quality is Known to be Low
First note that unlike the contract for the high-quality agent who is expected
to operate on all types of tasks, the contract for a low-quality agent imposes no
such requirement. It is thus necessary to consider also payments after histories
along which at some t the agents choice is not to operate. A two-period contract
for a low-quality agent is depicted below.
One of the di¤erences between the present case and the previous one is that
the optimal mechanism provides no information rents to the agent. In particular,
a contract that pays a constant sum of c(l;e) per success provides e¢ cient incen-
tives and generates an expected utility of zero to the agent, which, in particular,
implies that it is optimal. The next lemma provides a characterization of the set
 lT of T -period optimal contracts when the agent is known to be of low-quality.
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Figure 4: Two-period contract for a low-quality agent.
Lemma 5 Properties of  lT
1. If a contract  lT 2  lT ; then ul
 
 lT ; sub1
   ul   lT ; sub 1 = c(l;e) and
ul
 
 lT ; sub0

= ul
 
 lT ; sub 1

.
2. If a contract  lT 2  lT ; then 9  lT 1 2  lT 1 s.t. 8!T 1 2 
T 1;  lT ( 1; !T 1) =
 lT 1 (!T 1). Also 9  lT 1 2  lT 1 s.t. 8!T 1 2 
T 1;  lT (0; !T 1) =
 lT 1 (!T 1).
3. If a contract  lT 2  lT ; then ml
 
 lT ; sub?

= T  c  pl 1 q(l;e) .
4. Assume that a T -period contract  lT satises EF and IR and for which
ul
 
 lT ; sub?

= u > 0. Then for any ~u 2 [0; u) there exists another T -
period contract ~ lT that also satises EF and IR and for which u
l
 
~ lT ; sub?

=
~u: Moreover, for any history !T 2 
T we have  (!T )  ~ (!T ) with at
least one strict inequality.
Proof: Property 1. First, observe that if ul
 
 lT ; sub1
   ul   lT ; sub 1 <
c
(l;e)
;then the low-quality agent will not exert e¤ort even if an easy task arrives in
the rst period. Also note that ul
 
 lT ; sub0
  ul   lT ; sub 1 since otherwise the
agent will accept the task and not exert e¤ort when a di¢ cult task arrives in the
rst period. Assume then that  lT 2  lT but ul
 
 lT ; sub1
 ul   lT ; sub 1 > c(l;e) .
Consider then the following changes: in sub0 adopt the same payment as in sub 1
and in sub1 add a payment of c(l;e) to every history of sub 1. Note that these
changes preserve incentives and decrease the expected payment, in contradiction
to the fact that  lT 2  lT .
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Property 2. Assume that this property is false.  lT 2  lT , so  lT provides
su¢ cient incentives in all subgames, and in particular in sub 1. Consider revising
the contract  lT to ~
l
T as follows
1. replace the payments in all histories that belong to sub 1 by payments in
one of the optimal T 1-period contracts ~ lT 1 2  lT 1 (that is, ~ lT ( 1; !T 1) =
~ lT 1 (!T 1))
2. adjust the contracts in other subgames correspondingly (that is, adopt in
sub0 the same payments as in sub 1, and adopt in sub1 the same payments
as in sub 1 and add c(l;e) to every history).
The proposed change preserves incentives to invest in all subgames after the
rst period and generates e¢ cient incentives in the rst period.
Since the new payment scheme in sub 1 is a contract in  lT 1; it minimizes
expected payment in all schemes that provide incentives. It follows that the pro-
posed change strictly decreases ul
 
 lT ; sub 1

because otherwise the  lT payment
restricted to sub 1 is a contract from  lT 1. Property 1 of the lemma implies
that this change also decreases ul
 
 lT ; sub0

and ul
 
 lT ; sub1

; in contradiction
to  lT 2  lT . The same argument also establishes that the payment in sub0 is a
contract in  lT 1.
Property 3. Consider the contract that pays c=(l;e) per success (i.e., pays
nc
(l;e)
after a history of n successes). Note that this is an optimal contract even
when the principal observes the type of the arriving task and the e¤ort exerted
by the agent. Therefore, it is an optimal contract when the tasks type and
the agents e¤ort are not observable. Since in this contract ml
 
 lT ; sub?

=
Tcpl 1 q(l;e) ; any optimal contract should pay the same expected payment as the
one described above.
Property 4. The proof is done by induction on the contracts length T:
Start with T = 1 and observe that since  l1 satises EF we have that
 l1 (0)  (l;d) l1 (1) +
 
1  (l;d)

 l1 ( 1)  c (6)
 l1 (0)   l1 ( 1)
 l1 (0)  (l;e) l1 (1) +
 
1  (l;e)

 l1 ( 1)  c
 l1 ( 1)  (l;e) l1 (1) +
 
1  (l;e)

 l1 ( 1)  c
There are two cases to consider.
Case 1  l1 (0)  ~u. From (6) we get that
(l;e)
l
1 (1) +
 
1  (l;e)

 l1 ( 1)  c   l1 (0)  ~u: (7)
Set ~ l1 (0) = ~u . If 
l
1 ( 1)  ~u; then set ~ l1 (0) = ~ l1 ( 1) = ~u and ~ l1 (1) =
~u+ c(l;e)
  l1 (1) ; where the last inequality follows from the fact that the original
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payment satised EF, which in particular implies that  l1 (1)   l1 ( 1) + c(l;e) :
Now note that since the expected payments are strictly lower in ~ l1 and both
contracts satisfy EF, there exists at least one history where the payment in
~ l1 is strictly lower than in 
l
1. If 
l
1 ( 1) < ~u; then (7) and the fact that
expected utility in  l1 is u implies that 
l
1 (1) >
c+~u (1 (l;e)) l1( 1)
(l;e)
. Set ~ l1 (1) =
c+~u (1 (l;e)) l1( 1)
(l;e)
and ~ l1 ( 1) =  l1 ( 1) : Recall that ~ l1 (0) = ~u and observe
that ~ l1 generates an expected utility of ~u and satises EF.
Case 2  l1 (0) < ~u. We start by setting ~
l
1 (0) = 
l
1 (0) and proceed by
decreasing the utility from exerting e¤ort by u ~u1 q ; which will generate for ~
l
1 an
expected utility of ~u: If  l1 ( 1)  u ~u1 q ; then set ~ l1 (!1) =  l1 (!1)   u ~u1 q for
!1 2 f1; 1g. If, however,  l1 ( 1) < u ~u1 q ; then set ~ l1 ( 1) = 0 and ~ l1 (1) =
~u+c q~ l1(0)
(1 q)(l;e) < 
l
1 (1) ; where the last inequality follows from the fact that when
 l1 ( 1) < u ~u1 q , decreasing the utility of the agent from exerting e¤ort by u ~u1 q
implies that the payment conditional on success should be decreased by more
than the amount decreased in the case where  l1 ( 1)  u ~u1 q . However, since
~u  q~ l1 (0) > 0, the payments in ~ l1 satisfy EF and all payments are lower.
Having established the claim for T = 1; we next assume that the statement
holds for T = K   1 periods and show that it holds for T = K periods. Assume
that there exists  lK for which u
l( lK ; sub?) = u > 0. Similarly to the proof for
T = 1, there are two cases to consider.
Case 1 ul
 
 lK ; sub0
  eu. We start by replacing the payment in sub0 with
a K   1-period contract ~ l(K 1)0 that generates an expected payment of ~u and
for which ~ l(K 1)0 (!K 1)   lK (0; !K 1) 8!K 1 2 
K 1. Such a contract
exists by the induction argument. If ul
 
 lK ; sub 1
  ~u; then we replace the
payments in sub 1 by a K 1-period contract ~ l(K 1) 1 (!K 1) that generates an
expected payment of eu and for which we have ~ l(K 1) 1 (!K 1)   lK ( 1; !K 1)
8!K 1 2 
K 1(again, such a contract exists by the induction argument). We
complete this part of the argument by replacing the payments in sub1 by a
K   1-period contracts ~ l(K 1)1 (!K 1) that generates an expected payment of
~u + c(l;e)
and for which ~ l(K 1)1 (!K 1)   lK (1; !K 1) 8!K 1 2 
K 1 (again,
such a contract exists by the induction argument). We still have to show that
there exists a history !K for which the inequality is strict. However, since the
new contract ~ lK generated from the three contracts ~
l
(K 1)z for z =  1; 0; 1
generates a strictly lower expected payment and all contracts satisfy e¢ ciency,
there must exist at least one history for which the inequality is strict.
The proof of the case where ul
 
 lK ; sub0

< ~u is similar. 
Remark 9 An immediate consequence of the lemma and in particular of Prop-
erty 3 is that for all  lT 2  lT ; we have ul
 
 lT ; sub?

= 0.
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9.2 Agents Quality is Unobservable
We are now ready to characterize the optimal contract-pair when (l;e)  (h;d);
which is shown to have a very simple structure: Namely, the two contracts are
the same and they pay a xed compensation per success. Moreover, this contract
belongs to the set of optimal contracts when the agent is known to be a low-
quality agent. We start by establishing the latter.
Lemma 6 When (l;e)  (h;d); (hT ;  lT ) is an optimal contract-pair, only if
 lT 2  lT .
Proof. Assume by way of contradiction that (hT ; 
l
T ) is an optimal contract-
pair, but  lT =2  lT . Since (hT ;  lT ) is optimal the contract-pair is admissible
and in particular satises IR and EF. Since  lT =2  lT ; Remark 9 implies that
ul( lT ; sub?) > 0. Hence, Property 4 of Lemma 5 implies that there exists a
contract ^ lT 2  lT such that for every history !T 2 
T ,  lT (!T )  ^ lT (!T ) with
strict inequality for at least one !T 2 
T . Consider replacing (hT ;  lT ) by the
pair (^ lT ; ^
l
T ). To verify that this contract-pair satises EF, note rst that since
(h;d)  (l;e) EF is satised for the high-quality agent whenever it is satised
for the low-quality one, and the latter holds since ^ lT 2  lT . Obviously, IC holds
as well for this new contract-pair (^ lT ; ^
l
T ). By denition, the expected payments
to the low-quality agent are now lower, and the same (with weak inequality) also
holds for the high-quality agent. That is,
(i) ml

^ lT ; sub?

< ml( lT ; sub?) and (ii) m
h

^ lT ; sub?

 mh(hT ; sub?).
To verify (ii); recall that the original contract-pair (hT ; 
l
T ) was incentive-compatible,
which in particular implies that the high-quality agent prefers the contract hT
to  lT . By Property 4 of Lemma 5 the new contract ^
l
T generates for the high-
quality agent an even lower expected utility than  lT . Since this contract satises
EF, the monotonicity relation between expected payment and expected utility
implies (ii). This establishes the contradiction to the statement that the original
contract-pair (hT ; 
l
T ) was optimal.
Theorem 2 When (l;e)  (h;d); the optimal contract-pair (^hT ; ^ lT ) is
^hT (!T ) = ^
l
T (!T ) =
c  n (!T )
(l;e)
where n (!T ) is the number of successes in !T .
The proof of the theorem is a simple result of the following claim and hence
will be provided after the proof of the claim.
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Claim 3 Assume that the principal is asked to provide the low-quality agent with
an expected utility of u  0 such that
1. incentives to exert e¢ cient e¤ort are preserved
2. the expected utility of the high-quality agent is minimized among all con-
tracts that provide e¢ cient incentives to the low-quality agent and gener-
ates the expected utility of u  0 to the low-quality agent.
This is achieved by amending the contract ^ lT described in Theorem 2 and
adding a payment of u after every history. That is,
~ lT (!T ) =
cn (!T )
(l;e)
+ u for all !T 2 
T .
Proof. We prove the claim by induction on the length of the contract T . Start
with one period. Recall that in this case the only optimal contract for the
low-quality agent is  l1(1) = c=(l;e), 
l
1( 1) = 0, and  l1(0) = 0. Denote by
u(!1) the additional payment above  l1(!1) for !1 2 f 1; 0; 1g. First, note
that u(1)  u( 1); because otherwise the agent would not exert e¤ort when an
easy task arrives. In addition, observe that u(1)  u(0); because otherwise the
low-quality agent would pass the task even if an easy task arrives. Also note
that u(0)  u( 1), because otherwise the agent would accept the task (maybe
without exerting e¤ort) even when the arriving task is di¢ cult, pt = d. Recall
that since (l;e)  (h;d); if incentives are provided for the low-quality agent
to exert e¤ort on pt = e, then the high-quality agent will operate on all types
of tasks, if he faces the same contract. Moreover, (h;d)  (l;e) implies that
specifying u(1) = u(0) = u( 1) = u necessarily minimizes the utility of the
high-quality agent from all contracts that generate e¢ cient incentives for the
low-quality agent and provides him with the additional utility of u.
We assume that the statement holds for T = K   1 periods and proceed
to the proof of the statement for T = K periods. Consider a contract  lK that
yields a utility of u to the low-quality agent and minimizes the expected utility of
the high-quality agent. We rst show that the induced contracts on sub1, sub0;
and sub 1 by  lK are as described in the statement of the claim. The reason
for that is as follows: assume by way of contradiction that the above statement
is false and note that: (i) it is always possible to construct a contract ~ lK such
that the induced contracts on sub1, sub0; and sub 1 by ~ lK are as described in
the statement of the claim and for which there are u1, u 1; and u0 such that the
low-quality agent is indi¤erent between ~ lK and 
l
K ; (ii) the incentives for the
low-quality agent are preserved in ~ lK ; and (iii) by the induction argument, in
each of the subgames, the amended contract ~ lK decreases the expected utility of
the high-quality agent. We still need to show that u1 = u 1 = u0 = u. However,
this proof is identical to the proof of the one-period case.
43
Proof of Theorem 2. First observe that ^ lT 2  lT and that (^hT ; ^ lT ) satises
EF and IR. It follows that if we prove that (^hT ; ^
l
T ) is optimal we are done.
As in Theorem 1, we need to show that the contract ^ lT described in the theo-
rem minimizes the expected utility of the high-quality agent from all contracts
belonging to  lT ; but the rest of the proof follows from the previous claim for
u = 0.
10 Appendix C: The Discounting Case
10.1 Three-period example
We now show that there exist parameters for which the two following inequalities
2
 
q + (1  q)(1  (l;e)

)(1 q)(l;e)

1  (1  q)(l;e)
ph

 (1  )

1  ph
 1  

> 0
and
(1  q)(l;e)

1  (1  q)(l;e)
ph

  (1  ) 1  

 0
hold. Note rst that the second inequality holds with equality when
 =
1 

1 
 +  (1  q)(l;e)

1  (1 q)(l;e)
ph
 = ;
and holds as a strict inequality for   . We next verify that there exist
parameters for which, when   ; the rst inequality holds as well. Plugging
the expression of  into the rst inequality and rearranging gives us
(1  ) (1  q)(l;e)

1  (1 q)(l;e)
ph
 

 
q + (1  q)(1  (l;e)

)  1 + ph
1 
 +  (1  q)(l;e)

1  (1 q)(l;e)
ph
 > 0;
that is, when  = ; the rst inequality is satised if 
 
q + (1  q)(1  (l;e)

)+
ph > 1: That is,
q(h;d) + (1  q)(h;e) > 1  
 
q + (1  q)(1  (l;e)

):
For  = 1; this inequality requires that when the high-quality agent accepts
both types of tasks, and the low-quality one accepts only easy tasks, the prior
probability to see a success in a given period is always higher for the high-quality
agent. Since (h;e) > (l;e); this inequality holds for  high enough.
10.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Assume, by way of contradiction, that there exists t such that after some history
the payment for success in t is not postponed, while after t0 > t that follows the
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same history the payment is postponed for d > 0 periods. (Recall that whenever
a payment is postponed for some k periods, it is paid conditional on successes in
all periods in between.) Assume that the history is such that until time t there
were k failures and l successes, while between t and t0 there were m failures and
n successes (in addition to success in period t). The cost of postponing " for d
periods after t0 is
(1  )

1  ph
k+m 
ph
l+n+1 1  d
d
!
"
while the benet is


q + (1  q)  1  (l;e)t" (1  q)l+n+1  (l;e)l+n+1 k+l+m+n+2 "
(1  q)(l;e)"  (1  q)d+1
 
(l;e)
d+1 "
(ph)
d
#
where t"  k+m is the number of periods in which the low-quality agent failed
while using the strategy of exerting e¤ort if and only if an easy task arrives.
Next consider the e¤ect of postponing the payment for success in period t
for d periods. The cost of postponement of an amount " is
(1  )

1  ph
k 
ph
l 1  d
d
!
"
while the benet of the postponement is


q + (1  q)  1  (l;e)t0" (1  q)l  (l;e)l k+l+1
"
(1  q)(l;e)"  (1  q)d+1
 
(l;e)
d+1 "
(ph)
d
#
where t0"  k is the number of periods in which the low-quality agent failed
while using the strategy of exerting e¤ort if and only if an easy task arrives.
Note that t0"  t".
Recall that in the original mechanism a payment is postponed for d periods
after period t0. Consider then decreasing the postponed amount after period t0
by " and instead postponing the amount "0 for d periods after period t where "0
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is chosen such that the expected benets are the same. That is,
0 = 

q + (1  q)  1  (l;e)t0" (1  q)l  (l;e)l k+l+1 "
(1  q)(l;e)"0   (1  q)d+1
 
(l;e)
d+1 "0
(ph)
d
#
  q + (1  q)  1  (l;e)t" (1  q)l+n+1  (l;e)l+n+1 k+l+m+n+2 "
(1  q)(l;e)"  (1  q)d+1
 
(l;e)
d+1 "
(ph)
d
#
= 

q + (1  q)  1  (l;e)t0" (1  q)l  (l;e)l k+l+1 (1  q)(l;e)
f"0   (1  q)d  (l;e)d "0
(ph)
d
 

q + (1  q)  1  (l;e)t" t0" (1  q)n+1  (l;e)n+1 m+n+1
 
"  (1  q)d  (l;e)d "
(ph)
d
!
g
which can be written as
0 = 

q + (1  q)  1  (l;e)t0" (1  q)l  (l;e)l k+l+1 (1  q)(l;e) 
f"0   (1  q)d  (l;e)d "0
(ph)
d
 

q + (1  q)  1  (l;e)t" t0" (1  q)n+1  (l;e)n+1 m+n+1
 
"  (1  q)d  (l;e)d "
(ph)
d
!
g
or
0 = "0[1 
  
(l;e)

(1  q)
(ph)
d
!d
] 
"[1 
  
(l;e)

(1  q)
(ph)
d
!d 
q + (1  q)  1  (l;e)t" t0" (1  q)n+1  (l;e)n+1 m+n+1:
That is,
"0 =

q + (1  q)  1  (l;e)t" t0" (1  q)n+1  (l;e)n+1 m+n+1":
Note that while this change does not a¤ect the utility of the agent, the change
in the expected costs are
(1  )

1  ph
k 
ph
l 1  d
d
!
"0   (1  )

1  ph
k+m 
ph
l+n+1 1  d
d
!
"
= (1  )

1  ph
k 
ph
l 1  d
d
!
"
q + (1  q)  1  (l;e)t" t0" (1  q)n+1  (l;e)n+1 m+n+1   1  phm phn+1 < 0
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where the rst inequality follows from plugging the expression of "0 and the
last inequality follows from the inequalities ph > (1  q)(l;e), 1   ph  ; and
t0"  t". Therefore, the assumed change decreases the cost of the principal while
preserving the utilities of the low-quality agent. Contradiction to the assumed
optimality of the mechanism.
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